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Part I Introduction
Purpose of the Study
Nature of the Problem

1The Financial Policies of George Frederick arren
Introduction
Purpose of the Study
The year 1933 and the first six months of 1934 are of pro-
found significance in the banking and fiscal history of the
United States. 3y legislative enactment and by executive or-
der, measures have been taken that have significantly altered
our financial system; the precise nature of the changes ini-
tiated can be fully discerned only as time reveals it. One
may, however, best begin a study of current monetary issues
and acquire a measure of intelligent understanding of what
has taken place through an investigation of the monetary the-
ories of Lr. George Frederick .arren, whose policies have most
strongly influenced President Roosevelt in the formulation of
and initiation of a programme for financial recovery*
The traditional ula Economist fears several features of
Dr. Warren's programme and often calls him radical; the KTev
Economist declares he points the only way out of the economic
chaos into which we fell. It will be our purpose to investi-
gate his theories and to discover what grounds there may be
for these characterizations.

The Nature of the problem
The problem of surveying the monetary theories of Dr. George
Frederick Warren seems to resolve itself into a study of whether
his doctrines of money, the gold standard, inflation, deflation,
end reflation are orthodox, traditional, or radical or whether
some belong in one category and other in another. Is he an Old
Economist or a New Economist in these matters? Are his theories
revolutionary? Are they sound, scientific, scientifically v alid?
Does he subordinate recovery to reform? Are the measures he prc-
Doses inflationary or deflationary? Is there statistical justi-
fication for ois index number theory? What is likely to be the
result of adoption of these doctrines as a part of our permanent
policy? Before attempting to arrive at conclusions on these
points, and in order to understand Dr. barren's objectives, it
will first be necessary to survey the events leading up to the
great crisis, karch, 1933.
»
PART II

The dramatic event of March 4, 1933, when President Roose-
velt closed the banks in every state or allowed them to operate
under very severe restrictions, was the culmination of more than
three years of increasingly intense economic distress. For three
years prices had been declining, to increasingly lower levels;
commodity surpluses had piled up; credits had become restricted;
factories continued to close throughout the country; unemployment
haa probably reached the twelve million mark; relief for the un-
employed had broken down. A desperate people, its morale under-
mined, to insure its self-preservation were raiding the money
stocks of the country. Yet, as a nation we lacked neither natural
resources nor wealth.
The causes of the "great catastrophe" were discernible beneath
the surface of prosperity in the late spring and suiumer of 1929.
Sales on the New York Stock Exchange for October, 1929, reached
141,668,000 shares. "According to tne Dow-Jones index of stock
prices, 30 industrials fell from an average of 364.9 to 62.7 dol-
lars per share, a group of 20 public utilities stocks cropped
from 141.9 to 28.0 dollars per snare. Twenty railroad stocks
declined from an average of 182.0 to 28.1 dollars per share.
—
According to the New York *Times* index of 50 stocks (25 indus-
trial and 25 railroads) the average price fell from 300.52 to
58.65 dollars per share. A compilation by the Standard Statis-

tics Company (Inc.) of 421 stocks'—based upon an index number
of 100 as the 1926 monthly average-shov/ed a decline from 225.2
to 49.1 from September, 1926, to January, 1933. According to
the same source and during the same period, the index of 20
New York bank stocks fell from 357.8 to 67. 9. 1 — The monthly
average of cash dividend payments at current rates for the
six months period, July to December, 1929, was 2,549.6 millions
of dollars; the monthly average over the full year of 1930
was 2,601.9 millions of dollars; in 1931 the monthly dropped
to 2,134.7; and in 1932 it stood at 1,326.9 millions of
dollars, indicating that it was not until recent months
that dividends began to recede substantially in the face
q
of v/ide-spread deflation in all other respects. The
composite index of industrial production fell from 110
in 1929 to 48 in 1932. The physical volume of trade dropued
from 103 in 1929 to 62 in 1932; and to 54 in January 1933.
"
3
These statistics speak for themselves. The wretched con-
dition of employment has been described above. It may be
1. Chas. A. Beard & Geo. H. E. Smith, "The Future Comes",
pp. 4 & 5.
2. Ibid, p. 6.
3. Ibid, d. 7.

added that "the Federal Reserve Board's unadjusted combined
index of factory employment (with the monthly average of 1923-
1925 as 100) fell from 105.4 in September, 1929, to 58.1 in
January, 1933. m1 . Meanwhile, the farmer had been in a serious
plight. Since the war more than 450,000 full owners had lost
their farms, and more than 200,000 had been reduced to the
status of tenants. "Their gross farm income had dropped from
approximately sixteen billions to eleven billions.''^ Between
1929 and 1932 occurred a still further decline of thirty-three
per cent. Gross income declined by fifty-seven per cent in
1932. Prices paid to the farmer stoou at 205 in 1920 and at
51 in January, 1933; while costs of what he bought dropped
only from 206 in 1920 to only 105 in 1932.
The debt buraen was another contributing factor in the
general decline. Total debts owing in the United States in
1929 are estimated at 234 billions as compared with 362 bil-
lions of total wealth. The total interest-bearing aebt was
estimated at 154,761 millions of dollars in 1929. During
three years of deflation and liquidation the debt fell to
134 billions of dollars in 1933 while the national income
fell from eighty- five to forty billions of dollars.
Up to the spring of 1932, the temper and fortitude of the
people were remarkable. From that time restlessness became
1. Chas. A. Beard & Geo. H. E. Smith, "The Future Comes",
p. 7
2. Ibid.

more apparent. Lore than one hundred forty-four organizations
in scores of communities over twenty-nine states began barter
or to use "wooden money", or scrip. Violence broke out among
farmers of the middle west. The law could not or did not deal
with these restless elements. In the East labor grumbled more
audibly than before. All through this period the people had
retained belief in the soundness of the banks; propaganda in
finance, in government, ana among business leaders sustained it.
The report of the Comptroller of the Currency showed that bank
resources ana deposits had not been seriously depleted between
1928 and 1931. But at the end of the fiscal year of 1932, it
was discovered that a drop of nearly 13 billions of dollars in
resources and of almost 11^ billions in deposits in one year
had occurred. The number of oanks reporting had decreased
6,167 in three years.
Three weeks later the quarterly statement of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation revealed that 5,582 banks and trust
companies had been borrowing three times the total amount of
the railroads which were the next largest borrowers. Then the
people began to mistrust the condition of the banks.
On February 14, the state of Michigan was obliged to declare
a bank holiday which so alarmed the people of the country that
before March 4 nearly $1,550,000,000 had been withdrawn from
the Federal Reserve System. Through February and March a net
cf
c
<
loss amounting to 282.7 millions in gold resulted before Execu-
tive Orders and Emergency legislation stopped it. We had faced
one of the most serious banking crises in our history.
By March 3 a very great number of the banking institutions of
the country had been closed either by order of state authorities
or of the Comptroller of the Currency; authority had been grant-
ed to the Comptroller for the purpose by joint congressional re-
solutions on February 25 and March 3. But uniformity of proce-
dure and centralization of authority must be achieved; so on
March 6 tne President proclaimed a national oanking holiday which
would affect Federal Reserve Banks as well as all other banking
institutions and was to remain operative through March 9. Ex-
cept by special permission of the Secretary of tne Treasury, with
the approval of the President every banking institution was for-
bidden to "pay out, export, earmark, or permit the withdrawal or
transfer in any manner or by any device whatsoever, of any gold
or silver coin or bullion or currency." Neither coulu they "pay
out deposits, make loans or discounts, deal in foreign exchange,
or transfer credits from the United States to any place abroad."
A war-time measure embodied in the Act of Congress of October 6,
1917, which had not been repealed, enabled the President to make
this proclamation and also to issue many other regulations re-
lating to banking matters through the Secretary of the Treasury.
That official was empowered to allow banking institutions to
(<
resume banking functions, to arrange for the issuance of clear-
ing house certificates and to provide for the acceptance and
separate handling of new deposits. Since a majority of the
banks were really solvent the purpose was to enable the healthy
banks to reopen as quickly as possible.
In his message to the Seventy-Third Congress, President
Roosevelt requested legislation "to give the executive branch
of the government control over banks
,
authority to open
such banks as have already been ascertained to be in sound con-
dition and authority to reorganize and reopen such banks as
may be found to require reorganization to put them on a sound
basis," ana for amendments to the Federal Reserve Act to pro-
vide for the issuance of whatever additional currency might
be needed to meet the emergency. So Public Act No. I was
passed that day granting to the President needed emergency
powers, an illustration one period in our history when demo-
cratic government was not "a slow, clumsy, inflexible process
in the face of modern conditions ." 1
The Emergency Banking Act may be outlined as follows. Its
major provisions are grouped under four titles.
1. Chas. A. Beard & Geo. H. E. Smith, "The Future Comes",
p. 20.
(c
10
Title I
It
A. Confirmed what the President had done under ex-
isting legislation and uoon his own initiative.
B. Broadened plenary Dower of the President granted
October 6, 1917.
C. Added to Section 11 of the amended Federal Reserve
Act a provision granting the Secretary of the Treasury
power to require the surrender of all gold, bullion,
and gold certificates in exchange for an equivalent
amount of any ether form of coin or currency issued
under the lews of the United States. A penalty was
enunciated against those who failed to comply. Con-
trol of the National Banking System and the Federal
Reserve System was placed in the hands of the President.
Title II
It
A. Authorized the Comptroller of the Currency to
appoint conservators for national banking associations
anywhere in the country and any bank or trust company
in the District of Columbia. This was so phrased as
not to 8dmit any impairment of the powers of the
President or other officials.
(c
(
Title III
This section was framed to strengthen the capital
structure of the bank.
A. Any national banking association could be
authorized, subject to certain conditions, to issue
preferred stock in amounts and at a par value ap jroved
by the Comptroller of the Currency.
B. A maximum dividend rate, cumulative, was placed at
six per cent per annum.
C. Holders of stocks were to have voting rights and
were relieved from assessments to restore impaired
capital of institutions.
D. A prior lien over common stocks for dividends
and upon liquidation was granted preferred stock.
E. The Secretary of the Treasury might, "with the
approval of the President, request the Reconstruction
Finance Corooration to subscribe for oreferred stock
of any national banking association or any State bank
or trust company in need of funds for capital purposes
or to make loans to such institutions for similar
purposes
.
1. Chas. A. Beard and Geo. H. E. Smith, "The Future Comes"
p. 22.

tie IV
Comorises an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act pro-
viding "Federal Reserve Banks with additional currency
in the form of 'circulating notes' to the full face
value of 'any direct obligations of the United States',
or 90 per cent of the estimated value 'of any notes,
drafts, bills of exchange, or bankers' acceptances'
acquired from any member bank or any individual, partner-
ship or corporation, and deposited with the Secretary of
the Treasury. ul
To supply State banks and trust companies, not members
of the Federal reserve system, with an adequate amount of
currency, should there be need, an amendment was passed
March 24, 1933.
An Executive order, issued March 10, set all the above
machinery in operation so that the Secretary of the
Treasury promulgated regulations and interpretations which
covered emergency conditions, later reopening Federal
Reserve Banks and other financial institutions under Federal
supervision. As a result, beginning March 13 en orderly
reopening of banks corut. enced, Federal and State authorities
1. Chas. A. Beard and Geo. H. E. Smith, "The Future Comes",
c
operating together in harmony, in spite of the tremendous
confusion Rnd technical difficulties involved so that by
March 25, two hundred sixty-five national hanks with total
deposits of approximately $350,000,000 were prepared to
open or were already doing normal hanking business.-1- "By
the middle of April approximately eighty per cent of the
Federal Reserve member banks had reopened without re-
strictions, and about seventy per cent of the State banking
institutions were doing business on an unrestricted basis."
By the middle of March, "currency which had exceeded seven
end a half billion dollars at the peak of withdrawals be-
gan to flow to the banks, and, by the end of May, money
in circulation was reduced to 5,876 millions of dollars."*5
It was reported by May 31, that nearly 12, "87 banks hold-
ing approximately ninety per cent of the total amount of
money on deposit, had resumed full operations without re-
strictions. The immediate domestic emergency h?d been met,
and confidence was restored in the ability of our democratic
government to adapt itself to terrific crises.
1. Chas. A. Beard and Geo. H. E. Smith, "The Future Comes
p. 24.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
<
One of the most important of the many serious problems
left to be solved was the relation between gold and the na-
tion's business and financial structure. Had we abandoned
the gold stanuara when the banking holiuay was proclaimed?
Interpretation of the wording of the President's proclama-
tion, of the emergency banking act, and of the regulations
issued by tne secretary of the Treasury seemed to be diverse.
The essential feature of the gold standard which is the as-
sured right of the exchangeability of a nation's currency for
gold was certainly impaired or denied after Llarch 6 in prac-
tice
,
if not in law if the acts and orders pertaining to gold
were strictly interpreted. Banks were either closed so gold
could not be obtained; or when they reopened they were for-
bidden to disburse either gold or golu certificates.
The Executive Order of the ^resident on April 5, 1933,
prohibiting the hoarding of gold and requiring the delivery
of all golu coin, gold bullion and gold certificates into
tne Federal Reserve system on or before April 28, 1933, set-
tled the matter and definitely took the United States off
the gold standard. Gold required for industry, the profes-
sions and the arts, a personal allowance not to exceed
$100, rare coins, and legitimately licensed quantities

were made minor exceptions, ndditional restrictions,
however, were maae April 20 concerning the export of
gold under license, a more comprehensive order on Aug-
ust 29, 1933 merged all previous orders pertaining to gold
and prohibited all private holdings or transactions in gold
except under strict license and provided a fine or imprison
ment for all violations of the order.
A Joint Resolution, effective June 6, 1933 prohibited
the payment of obligations in gold to all future obliga-
tions. Such obligations were to be met by payment "dollar
for dollar, in any coin or currency, which at the time of
payment is legal tender for public ana private debts"! on
the ground that it was against the public policy. These
constituted a host of public and private obligations which
in the past and up to the spring of 1933 provided for pay-
ment in golc or golc. coin, of the present standard of value
probably amounting to nearly one hundred billions of dol-
lars were no longer redeemable in gold. The final solu-
tion of what is to be ^.one about gold, both in relation
to ouu business agreements and to our currency
1. Chas. A. Beard and Geo. H. E. Smith, "The Future
Comes", p. 26.
<
system, will emerge in a long-tine, larger Recovery Programme
rather than from our emergency measures.
Between July and October the government monetary policy op-
erated along lines that are stated in the President's July fifth
message in which he declared: "The first task is to restore prices
to a level at which industry pnd, above all, agriculture, can
function profitably and efficiently. The second task is to Dre-
serve the stability of this adjustment once achieved."
During this period mechanisms of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act, including the pro-
gramme of oublic works, were mainly utilized. The Federal Reserve
System on its own initiative, rather than that of the Treasury,
made large open market purchases of government securities.
The foreign exchange policy would be called oassive: no attempt
was made to deoress the exchange rate of the dollar; it was merely
allowed to fluctuate with some freedom in its own way. The in-
tention was to keep the dollar exchange rate operating in a
generally downward, rather than uov/ard, direction.
T^e general price rise that befl:an in the spring reached its
high noint July 15; after this, occurred a sharp recession through
the remainder of the month, followed by another rise in September.
A second recession followed, continuing into October. In this
oeriod of erratic price movements, there emerged three viewooints
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regarding the reason for the orice recession ^nd the failure
of the orice indexes to re-attain and surpass the July level.
Agricultural interests and their political SDokesrnen, impelled by-
greatest relative loss of any ^roup, advocated the expansion of the
currency through the issue of greenbacks, as authorized by the
Thrraas Amendment. A second group asked for the devaluation of
the dollar as a means of Drice stimulation. After September 15,
and especially during the first half of October, the value of the
paoer dollar, as measured in gold through foreign exchanges, began
to rise. Prooonents of this policy urged active dollar depreciation
since continuing exchange deoreciation was a necessrry condition
for rising commodity orices, from their point of view. The im-
provement in the exchange rate was alarming to them. Their plan
involved the establishment of government monoply for the purchase
of gold newly mined in the United States. It did not at this time
propose a re-definition of the dollar in terms of its gold content
nor the creation of machinery for the direct control of foreign
exchange. The intention of the policy was to effect indeoendent
control of the American commodity orice level. The two procedures
advocated were: (1) To set the orice of gold immediately at
141,34 an ounce, which would represent a fifty per cent reduction
in the weight of the gold dollar-the maximum authorized under the
Thomas amendment; or (2) to begin ourchases of gold at a price
I
corresponding closely to the prevailing rate of foreign exchange
and gradually to raise it toward the maximum authorized figures."^"
If the first procedure were adopted, it was predicted, American
commodity prices would almost immediately rise to nearly ore-
deoression level; in case of the acceptance of the second pro-
cedure, the orice rise would progress gradually, unaffected hy
speculative or other factors in the international exchange market.
According to the third viewpoint, the failure of prices to respond
to the r.easures of stimulation attempted were mainly due to the
hesitation of business enterprise, resulting from uncertainty
regarding monetary policies. The floating of bond issues for
financing normal capital outlays was particularly difficult. It
was necessary for the President to take action by adopting a de-
finite policy with respect to the permanent gold content of the
dollar
.
Meanwhile domestic and foreign affairs operated to hasten the
President's decision. Discontent in the Middle "'estern farm
districts reached rather alarming proportions. Germany withdrew
from the League of Nations ,and France passed through another
Cabinet crisis, events disturbing to our economic and monetary
1. Leo Pasvol3ky, "Current Monetary Issues", p. 102.

health. Fear that an upward movement of the dollar exchange rate
would result from the possible return of American funds abroad
seized the minds of several leaders, who looked for an unfavorable
reaction on the course of commodity prices in the United States.
On announcing his decision with resoect to which policy the
government would adopt, the rresident said over the radio:
"It is the government's oolicy to restore the orice level first.
I would not know, an.1 no one else could tell, just what the per-
manent valuation of the dollar will be. To guess at a permanent
gold valuation now would certainly require later changes caused
by later facts."
So the government adopted the plan of raising prices through
direct depreciation of the Daper dollar in terms of gold, and
endorsed the idea that the control of American orices be freed
from international influences. Thus steps were taken toward a
managed currency, the gold purchase plan being nut into operation
October 25. At first, only domestic ourchases of newly mined
gold were made at official orices set at progressively higher
levels. At the end of the month it was decided to extend operations
to foreign markets also.

Certain Aspects of American Economic Thought
Leading up to These Events
The American Government thus became a pioneer in applying
the the-ry that rising prices induced by monetary oolicies are
a perequisite to economic recovery. Certain factors in our
economic history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centur'ss
leading up to this event may well be reviewed at this point.
For sometime thinkers of a certain monetary school had
maintained that factors other than credit and currency were
the csuse of the price-level changes and that the remedy should
be a monetary one. The theory developed that it would be
possible to use an inconvertible paoer money instead of a
currency based on a Darticular commodity. Such a plan would
make it possible to vary the amount of the circulating medium
to keep the price level as stable as possible. An index number
of the prices of commodities might be determined; if that index
number should tend to rise the currency authority for the country
would reason that too much money was in circulati n. He would
immediately stop further issues of currency until the demand
for it caught up with the supply and prices ceased rising. As
a further device suggested to check undesired advance in prices,
government securities could be sold to take money out of cir-
culation. If a declining tendency in price averages set in,
more currency would have to be sent out. To get more money

into circulation, fresh currency issues to Day the governments
bills could be made and tax proceeds could be utilized to-
gether with the sale of government securities. The Currency
Authority could also purchase government securities and pay
with its own currency.
But plans for varying the supply of an inconvertible govern-
ment paper money were not easily popularized. Memories of French
Revolutionary assignats end of our American continental notes
were yet living. In the last decade of the nineteenth century
the defeat of the bimetallist parties both in India and in the
United States left advocates of the single gold standard in a
temporary position of vantage.
Price staoiliza tionists
,
then, had to devise Dlans which would
operate under a gold standard. They quite naturally conceived
the idea of varying from time to time the gold content of the
currency unit. By such a device they believed currency could
be kept on a gold basis and by changing from time to time the
amount of gold represented by each unit of currency, the
price stability could be established. If price averages
rose, the gold weight of the dollar could be increased and
fewer dollars would then be coined out of a given amount of

bullion. Conversely, falling prices could be counteracted
by permitting gold to be coined into more dollars. Proponents
of this commodity dollar usually advocated that all gold coins
be removed from circulation leaving a currency of reaper certi-
ficates. These certificates should, then, be convertible into
gold only in large amounts, primarily for the purpose of naying
money abroad. Official proclamations would announce the changes
in the gold content of the dollar since the amount of gold that
could be obtained for each paper dollar would vary.
The idea of the dollar of fluctuating gold content was first
suggested by an American astronomer, Simon Newcomb in 1879.1
In 1892 an Englishman by the name of Aneurin '"/illiams, sub-
mitted the details for a plan of this sort to the "Economic
Journal."^ The leading promoter of the theory in the United
States has been Professor 1rving Fisher of Yale University.
While he has been encouraging to advocates of other olans to
stabilize prices, he has been most active in propaganda for
the commodity dollar since 1911. At first he used the term
"compensated dollar" end then "stabilized dollar" to charac-
terize his plan. The expression "commodity dollar" was used
later and has come to replace the other terms.
1. Harold S. Reed, "The Commodity Dollar", p. 5.
Parrar & Rinehart Pamphlets, No. 2.
2. Ibid.

After 1920, Federal Reserve Banks attained a pos ; tion in
which it wss possible to b ase their credit operations on broad
economic considerations. They were able to direct less attention
to problems of protection of gold holdings, to the support of
the Treasury's borrowing operations, and to earning dividends
for member bank stockholders. An increasing confidence de-
veloped in the ability of the Federal Reserve Banks to stabilize
price levels; consequently enthusiasm for the Fisher plan waned.
The years between 1921 and 1929 saw much controversy over
the "Federal Reserve policy regarding the amount of emphasis
that should be given to price level stability, as contrasted
with other economic considerations; and in these discussions
the advocates of utilizing the credit powers of the reserve
system to combat price changes were especially vocal.""'"
Among those contending that the relative stability of prices
for a few years after 1923 was due almost entirely to Federal
Reserve policies wss Professor John ffc. Commons. He believed,
however, that the future administrations of the system might
be endowed with less wisdom than the one in office at that
time and so advocated that the Federal Reserve Act be amended
1. Harold S. Reed, "The Commodity Dollar"
Ferrar -nd Rinehart Panrohlets, No. 2, p. 6.

to make it legally encu-nbent upon the system to utilize its powers
to insure orice-level stability in the future.
Between January, 1926 and July, 1927, the monthly All Commodities
Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics fell about ten oer cent,
from 104 to 94; in consequence the money market was greatly dis-
turbed. The Federal Reserve Banks, subsequent to the latter date,
set about vigorous measures to ease the money market not all of which
were salutary. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 1927
maintained low discount rates presumably to induce flow of funds out
of this country and thereby aid Great Gritain and other nations in
establishing more securely the gold standard thereby causing a
stock market "bubble." So throughout the depression the Federal
Reserve Banks managed currency vain]y but energetically to being back
prosperity. After July, 1927, began a raoid increase in the volume
of member bank loans and investments as well as of new caoital issues
of business corporations
.
During the first half of 1928 wholesale
prices strengthened slightlv, a result partly attributable to the
increase flow of bank credit into oeople's incomes. Great stimu-
lation of the security market use of bank credit developed ab-
sorbing the energies of the reserve administration in counteracting
the flow of credit into security channels. It is generally agreed
that at this critical period the Reserve banks fai]ed to restrain
speculative use of credit after the stimulation of the markets
greed for funds. This intensive security market activity did not
decline until security prices broke of their own weight. One of
the most severe deflation of commodity Drices in our history followed
upon the subsequent security reaction -/hen it finally developed in
*
1929. In 1933, the Reserve system initiated action, which if
attempted earlier, might have been more successful; it began
immense open market operations to check the decline. Credit Theory
economists maintain that the events of 1927 and those intervening
between that period and the ultimate crash were an excellent
illustration of the impossibility of sustaining commodity orices
after it is understood that security prices are out of line v/ith
coroorate earnings. They further emohasize the fact that it is
virtually impossible to check declining commodity orices in a
period of severe market recession.
Professor Irving Fisher, however, is confident that:
"If we had had a wholesale commodity Drice stabilization it
would have meant that commodity prices, instead of going down as
they did generally b etween 1923 and 1929, would have remained
c nstant, end the stock market would have remained constant, ^nd
the stock market would have gone up even more th8n it did. Ihe
later consequences would not have been so severe as they have
been, because stabilization of commodity prices would have pre-
vented the worst results that we have had in the last few years.""*"
1. Harold L. Reed, "The Commodity Dollar", "The Farrar and
Rinehart Pamphlets, No. 2", p. 84.

Returning to the opinions of Professor Commons explained above,
in am attempt to translate this point of view into legislation,
Representative Strong of Kansas introduced bills into the National
House of Representatives, none of which passed. On May2, 1932
Represne tative Goldsborough had the satisfaction of seeing his
price stabilization bill pass the House. Plans to stabilize prices
through the use of Federal Reserve power got no further than this
before the New Deal.
Events of the depression after 1929 caused a decline in the
influence of the advocates of credit control through Federal Re-
serve action as attempted after July, 1927. Prices declined to
increasingly lover levels giving opportunity for an increase in
the political influence of the "reflation" school or the inflation-
ists. This school believed credit operations were too mild to
restore prices and demanded gold revaluation. It proclaimed that
the gold content of the dollar must be reduced if price levels
were to be lifted and insisted that after prices had been raised
to a satisfactory level, gold manipulations should be depended
upon to avoid future changes in the price level. This group
succeeded in winning the confidence of the government in the first
year of the new admin 1 strati on; whereupon, the President deter-
mined upon a chan^ of monetary tactics in the fall of 1932 and
turned to the most convincing advocates of the Reflation School.

PART III
A Brief Sketch of Dr. Warren'
Rise to Prominence
r
The new leader in this alteration of tactics was Professor
George Frederick \ arren, of the i\Iew York ^tate College of Agri-
culture of Cornell University. It is said that to a great ae-
0r c e, his effectiveness may be attributed to his method. Ke
accepts the quantity theory of money and Professor Cassel's
theory of managed currency ana supports his conclusions by sta-
tistical charts (the most complete set of statistics ever assem-
bled in the study of the American monetary problem) which he
interprets to show that commodity price levels depend upon gold
factors, his reasoning has incited great controversy from the
point of view of logic and of statistical methodology. He be-
lieves in capitalism but insists it must devise a better money
system. To express his aoctrine in a sentence or two: Price
levels temporarily removed from their "normal" relationship to
golc must eventually return to their true position. In a gold
standard currency, the dollar must be depreciated in terms of
^old if prices are to rise. 3o with trie advent of Dr. Warren,
the stabilizationists reneweci their allegiance to the princi-
ples of the Fisher plan of 1911.
Dr. Warren was born aDout sixty years ago, the son of
Massachusetts "rugged individualists . " His father rounded the
Horn en route to California in the gold rush days, later sett-
ling in Nebraska as a farmer. There the son, George Frederick,
was born. In his young manhood he was graduated from the Uni-
versity of Nebraska and later took advanced degrees at Cornell
in agriculture. He served one year as a horticulturist
r
at the New Jersey Experiment Station. For more than thirty
years he has been student or teacher at Cornell.
Dr. Warren's special fields of instruction have been
farm crops and farm management, his interest in money arose
when he ooserved that he could not help the farmer by teach-
ing him to be efficient and produce large crops if the farmer
could not get adequate monetary payment for his labor. Three
standard books on farm management have resulted from his aca-
demic and practical experience.
It is noteworthy that during and immediately after the war
Br. Warren warned farmers not to run into debt because prices
were sure to fall ana supported his conclusions with elaborate
statistical studies made by his assistant, Frank A. Pearson.
Collaborating in these studies and conclusions the two profes-
sors published "Prices" in 1933. In conclusion he made the
statement: "There is, of course, a possibility that the United
States will make a monetary change that will restore prices."
When Henry taorgenthau, Jr. was commissioned by the Presi-
dent to organize the Governors' Agricultural Commission, as a
former student of Dr. Warren he naturally turned to his earlier
instructor, an established authority on farm problems. r.
Warren and his assistant came in frequent contact with the
President and their views on money were made known to him.
<J CSA \J ij '
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The influence of Warren and Pearson, however, was not strong
enough at this time to mold the New Deal programme, but the
President became more and more impressed with the wisdom of
reducing the gold content of the dollar as means of rapidly
establishing a new price level basis. Holland, Switzerland,
and France were the only countries remaining on the gold stand-
ard since the others had either reduced the gold content of
their currency or had abandoned gold in the post-war period.
Meanwhile, Dr. Warren had been made chief economist of the
Committee of the Nation, a body of economists organized to ad-
vise the Government and inform the nation on economic matters.
When the United States abandoned the gold standard in the
spring of 1933, there was no monetary expert among the
President's advisers who really favored the plan or who under-
stood the mechanics of currency management for a currency not
based on the gold standard. Dr. Warren was an intimate
friend of Henry J. Morgenthan and conversant with important
features related to the problem. The President called him in
conference in June and summoned him shortly to the service
of the government.
So Dr. Warren joined Dr. James Harvey Rogers of Ysle in
working out plans for a managed currency. Four "Brain Trustees"
originally worked on the plan, Adolphe Augustus Berle, Jr.
and Dr. P.exford Tugwell joining Dr. Warren and Dr. Rogers.
AO'
Finally, Dr. 'Varren, expert on orice levels, and Dr. Rogers,
the expert on the technique of exchange under the gold system,
gained complete control.
At first Dr. Warren calculated that the dollar should be
reduced in gold content about one-third which he had been
advocating for months through the Committee of the Nation.
Later both the Committee and Dr. Warren came to realize that
their calculations had omitted certain factors and proclaimed
a fifty per cent devaluation to be necessary"!" During the
sessions of the London Economic Conference the two economists
with others were constructing "numerous and conflicting charts"
to keeu the president duly informed on important trends. So
valuable did these currency dictators become that the President
sent them to Europe to study currency conditions. The result
of their investigations was the plan for the buying of sold
in the domestic and world market. The President had been
planning to adopt a plan similar to the British exchange
equalization fund long before October, 1953.
Great Britain and the continental press strongly objected
although many economists considered it only a mild imitation
1. Unofficial Observer, "The New Dealers", p. 138.
2. Ibid.

of the British plan. The Presiaent found the device opportune
because "encouraged by Liberty Loan experience, conversionscary
investors had decided that the administration did not intend to
inflate after all and--prompted by the European war scare and
fear lest France would go off gold—were beginning to repatri-
ate their money in America. That strengthened the dollar and
caused a decline in the prices of American exports. "*-
The technique of establishing the gold price operated in
this fashion. In the first period of the new plan, Warren, the
President, ilorgenthan ana sometimes Rogers met ana fixed the gold
price aaily. ThenMorgenthau bore the aecision to Jesse Jones of the
R. F . C. Later Lorgenthau, Warren, and Rogers maae the decision
each day.
Theie, then, are the events that led to the introauction into
our financial system of raaically different monetary policies from
any previously pursued in our history. Before entering upon a more
detailed study of Dr. Warren's monetary theories, one should have a
clear iaea of what he means by the "index number" and the "compensa-
ted" or "commodity dollar." An "inaex number" may be defined as a
percentage which shows the relation of the current level of prices
to the level obtaining at a previous year selected as a standard or
o
base, 1^26 for present calculations." A "compensated dollar," now
known as "commodity aollar," has a variable weight of golc with a
purchasing power as nearly constant as possible. The "Old Dollar,"
we remember had a constant weight of gold with a variable purchas-
ing power.
1. Unofficial Observer, "The New Dealers", p. 139.
2. "Prices", G • F. Warren and F. A. Pearson, o. 132.
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PART IV
A BRIEF SURVEY OF DR. WARREN 1 S
MONETARY DOCTRINES
(
Prelinrjinary to suggesting a constructive policy for
dealing with the economic debacle in which we struggle,
Dr. Warren offered a diagnosis of the catastrophe along the
following lines and based upon theories previously presented
in "Prices", in collaboration with Dr. Frank A. Pearson. It
was not ceused, as some have stated, by overproduction, by to o
much efficiency, by a business cycle, by too much democracy
,
by tariffs, or by lack of confidence
.
It is true that before the war total production of all
commodities increased at the compound rate of 4.03 per cent
and that from 1915 to 1929, the rate of increase "as only
2.11 per cent per year. Also before the war the total out-
put of all c omtnodi ties per capita rose 1.73 per cent per
year. In the period 1915-1929, it increased .64 per cent
per year. From 1865 to 1914 production hr.d increased
throughout the world at the rate of 3.3 5 per cent per year,
but since 1914 that rate of increase wes checked. The only
correct forecasts of the depression came from those who
found evidence of impending disaster in monetary factors
not in the thesis of overproduction. He is more nearly
in agreement with those who believe underconsumption rather
than overproduction ws-s a factor in the depression disaster.
Overproduction can be easily dealt with by decreasing pro-
duction; underconsumption, however, necessitates a program
44
of putting the unemployed to work so thrt they may increase
the body of consumers. It is no remedy to cut production
to what our nation, with 12,000,000 or more unemployed, can
buy.
It is an erroneous belief that the needs of men c^n be
supplied by a greatly decreased work week. The total human
time involved in producing a bushel of wheat or many other
grown or manufactured articles has probably not decreased
much more than the average increase in efficiency in the
production of all goods. Many invisible factors enter into an
economy such as ours. We do net have sudden and spectacular
increases in the cutout of total goods per capita; such a
condition may result from a soectacular invention in a given
industry, but not in industry as a whole. Instead, increased
efficiency results from a steady growth of efficiency in all
industry.
From Dr. Wsrren's point of vi ew, the depression has no
more relationship to a business cycle than a tidal wave has
to a t ide, but is rather the result of a collapse in th e
price structure from which there is no cyclical reeovery. ^
He asserts that during such a collapse; several suppressed
business cycles may occur and that such a favorable cycle
in the textile and shoe industries occurred in 1932.
The factor to correct at this time is not the organiza -
tion of society, but the tool in our economic system that
1. "prices", G . F. Warren, F. A. Pearson, p. 132.
• 4
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Is not functioning properly . To quote his exact thought:
"Most of us believe in a society organized on the basis of
individual initiative, that is, a capitalistic society. "1
"If we are to adopt state capitalism, socialism, or commun-
ism, it should be on the relative merits of these systems
rather than because of a failure of the medium of exchange
to function prooerly."2 He warns us that unless we can in-
vent a really stable measure of value we rre in danger of
having some form of socialistic state forced upon us which
will take over the regulation of distribution and production
•
Furthermore, Dr. Warren asserts that neither tariffs nor
lack of confidence caused the depression . Tariffs are useless
in the prevention of falling prices when gold is rising in
value. The movement to raise tariffs throughout the world
resulted from falling prices. The only way to get rid of
excessive tariffs is to restore prices. Since 1929 we have
su f fere d_ m ore from overc onf iden ce th an from lack of con -
fidence. The belief, developing in the fall of 1929, again
in 1930, a third time in the fall of 1931, and a fourth time
in the fall of 1932, that the depression was over prevented
remedial measures. Federal aid was extended to credit agencies
1. G. F. Warren, "Is Our Gold Standard Too Rigid 9 "
The "Forum", April, 1933, VoL^2,p. 195.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
c<
for the expansion of credit on this theory of lack of con-
fidence. The idea that we cm start a building boom in
spite of bankrupt supplies of buildings on the market is an
outstanding evidence of misplaced confidence.
Dr. Warren recognizes four f a ctors in prices, instead of
two as are commonly accepted; that is, the price of any given
commodity is the ratio of the supply of that commodity and
the demand for it to the supply of gold and the demand for it
.
Our present measure of value, then, "is a given weight of a
single commodity, the value of which changes with the supply
of this commodity, and the demand for it, in precisely the
same way as the value of any other commodity changes."
Although the demand for commodities was good when the business
collapse occurred, the increasing condition of unemployment
since that time has reduced demand; but we recognize this
last factor as a result rather than an initial cause of de-
pression. Reduced demand produces further depression. The
supply of gold, however, h8.g not been adequate to meet the
demands of the normal growth of business although it is
sufficient to support prices at about pre-war level v/ith
all the world back on the gold basis, providing gold is
used with pre-war efficiency. It was the fourth factor
in price that caused the depress ion, demand for gold, which
fell so low as to allow prices on a gold basis to double .
^
Then there developed a demand so high as to cause the de-
1. "Prices", G . F. Warren, F. A. Pearson, p. 116.
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FIGURE 79.— INDEX NUMBERS OF THE V/URLD GOLD PRODUCTION AND
WORLD MONETARY STOCKS OF GOLD, 1839-1931.
1880-1914 - 100.
World gold production is very erratic. It has a slow but
cumulative effect on monetary stocks.
1. "Prices", G • F. Warren & F. A. Pearson, p. 103.
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pression
.
The value of gold is, of course, determined by the world
supDly and the world demand. During the World War prices
on a sold basis doubled because most countries abandoned
the gold standard and stopoed bidding for gold, causing gold
to concentrate in the few countries where it is purchased
freely. The gold panic of 1926 resulted from the fact that
America and France followed the movement, begun in 1925,
toward a return to the gold basis and America largely fi-
nanced that return, not sufficiently recognizing the fact
that the return of the demand for gold would raise its
value and bring on a price collapse. The result was such
a rise in the value of gold th^t the movement toward
restoration had to be abandoned. The fact that gold stocks
increased thirty-eight per cent betv/een 1914 and 1928 has
misl ed many to believe since the gold supply is larger than
ever before, it must be large enough
.
But the fact is that
if the business of the world had increased 8t its pre-war
rate since 1914 there would be a great deficiency in gold
even at pre-war prices. World production of all basic
commodities increased only thirty-eight oer cent betv/een
1914 and 1928, precisely the seme amount as the increase in
gold. In other word s, there was just enough gold in 1928
to support pre-war prices if gold were employed with pre -
war efficiency. However, English prices had advanced to
cr
forty-five per cent above pre-war prices while American
prices were forty-one per cent above pre-war. Dr. Warren
considered that by August, 1933, ore-war relationship was
restored with prices at ninety when pre-war was one hundred.
"A price level below ore-war relationship to gold was to be
expected because of price momentum and inefficiency in the
use of gold."l Should the more than thirty countries now
off the gold standard decide to return to it and should the
United Spates remain on it ( as she was in April 1935), com -
modity prices will average below pre-war levels for the next
ten years. At that time he further believed that violent
price fluctuations would occur as each country strained to
acquire more than its pre-war share of the world's gold
supply, since each country would need almost fifty per cent
more than its pre-war total. So the situation in the spring
of 1953 would appear to be such as would result if the world
hsd suddenly acquired a double supply of gold ': nd, having
become adjusted to it , had lost the extra supply in two
successive collapses . In this manner, then, he would ex-
plain why prices fell.
1. G. F. Warren, "Is Our Gold Standard Too Rigid?"
April "Forum". 7q1.j*2,P. 197.
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FIGURE 83.—MONETARY CIRCULATION PLUS DEPOSITS PER
For 52 years, monetary circulation plus deposits per
dollar of gold increased about 1 per cent per year.
If any change has occurred in recent years, it ap-
pears that the rate of increase in the efficiency in
the use of gold is less rapid than formerly.
1. "Prices", G. F. Warren & F. A. Pearson, p. 107
DOLLAR OF GOLD IN THE UNITED STATES
1880-1932
.
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Will gold production increase prices? The attempt to
measure recovery and call it increase in gold production is
fallacious for three reasons: it measures the rate of in-
crease from an abnormally low point; it would be incorrect
because it is monetary stock not gold production that effects
prices; it is br.sed on the assumption that a gold supply
sufficient for pre-war prices is sufficient for business
needs. "Business became adjusted to orice level about fifty
per cent above pre-war r'~ To support such a orice level would
call for gold stocks equal to the normal supply, plus fifty
per cent<k*«G Did is an important industrial commodity, the
use of which increases at about the same rate as other basic
commodities . "1 T o meet the needs of Industry, gold stocks
should increase abo u t 5.1 5 per cent a year. ^ To accomplish
this increase, 5.6 per cent of stocks must be mined since
much of the production goes t o Industrial use . Actual pro-
duction of gold is about three-quarters of the amount
necessary to supply normal industrial use and add 5.15 per
cent to stocks . If the majority of nations were back on the
£old basis and gold were employed at pre-war efficiency, the
1. G. F. 'Varren, Is Our Gold Standard Too Rigid?"
"Forum" April, 1955, Vol. 92, p. 19V.
2. Warren and Pearson, "Prices" p. 82.
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Figure III
FIGURE 97. --WORLD PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER, 1839-1932
1880-1914 = 100
Silver production is much more uniform than the production
of gold. Symmetallism would give a more stable measure of
value than gold, but would not be entirely stable.
1. "Prices", G. F. Warren <& F. A. Pearson, p. 162

present supply of world gold stocks would now be sufficient
to support ore-war prices. But efficiency is not to be ex-
pected and most nations are still off the gold standard. It
is necessary that individuals, banks, and nations still hold
considerable reserves. " If the price level were adjusted to
the gold supply, the production is about sufficient to caus e
prices to decline one oer cent per year. 11
For many years, then, demand for gold ran low, and onr debt,
tax, and business structure gradually became adjusted, at
least fairly well, to a commodity price nearly fifty per cent
above the ore-war level. This circumstance olaces the nations
of the world in the oosition of holding a gold suoply of only
about two thirds the amount necessary to support the orice level
to which business is adjusted provided the nations which have
gone' off the gold standard still continue to bid for it. Under
such conditions demand for gold becomes so insistent that the
present gold supply is inefficiently used.
The dilemma resolves itself into a question of whether the
United States sball continue to deflate or shall reflate
since we are faced with the necessity of raising the orice
level to the debt evel or of lowering the debt level to the
orice level, a choice between two distinctly undesirable
measures. A continuation of deflation entails further bank-
ruptcies, foreclosures, ?nd publie defaults. Since at the
1. G. F. Warren, "Is Our Gold Standard Too Rigid?"
"Forum", April, 1933, Vol. 92, p. 197.
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FIGURE 105 .—WAGE RATES AND WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1790-1932.
From 1840 to 1914, wages trebled, but prices were about the
same at the beginning as at the end of the period.
1. "Prices' 1
, G. F. Warren & F. A. Pearson, p. 196

new price levels, public and private aebts are nearly equal to
national wealth, aebts will have to be reduced. To maintain the
pre sent price of gold means bringing the vmole debt and price
structure oovm. such drastic deflation as went on in the United
States oefore the Roosevelt administration came in could not con-
tinue-. Cur problem following the Civil War was very different,
.it that time we were the only important country off the metal
standard, whereas in February, 1933, we were the only important
country attempting to maintain the pre-war weight of gold, in its
currency. In the first three ana a half years following the Panic
of 1873, the prices of oasic commodities aropped nineteen per cent
while in the corresponding period of this aepression, prices of
the same commodities aecreased fifty-one per cent. Liquidation
must oe much greater.
r. barren's ideas on reflation may be briefly summarized
as follows, a rise in prices has the same effect without regard
to cause. . hen price levels are restorea , all prices oo not
rise equally »•*• In last few years many prices nav e not aec lined
or have aeclined unequally . To restore the price level would
make it unnecessary for those which have not declinea to ta^e
that path. .Using commodity prices wi 11 stimulate buying
,
open up employment , f-,ive an jape tus to renting ana building *
2
Tnen payment of debts and taxes will result. Many rates,
such as freight, telephone, aoctors 1 fees
1. "prices", G . F. \,arren x F. a. Pearson, p. 271.
2. Ibid., p. 371-3/2.

and others of similar type, are already rdjusted and will
not rise and need not fall. Furthermore, costs of distribu -
tion will rise only slightly, so that prices paid farmers
and other producers will rise much more th an retail o rices
and so bring farm prices into adjustment with others
. R e
-
employment, increased buying, business recovery will then
follow . To make these adjustments, the price level must
first be restored; the restoration of relationship of farm
prices to other prices will follow automatically
.
To Dr. Warren, stabilizing the commodity price level does
not mean that 8ny single commodity will be without fluctuation
in price due to supply or demand. It simply means that com-
modity prices as a whole will be freed from sweeping fluctua -
tion, due either to world supply of gold or frenzied changes
in demand for it .
Scientific money must have a constant purchasing power for
all commodities rather than a fixe d weight for t ne commodity
.
Since our whole tax and debt structure rests on commodity
prices it must be kept sound, and commodity prices must be
keot stable, not the weight of gold for which a dollar will
exchange . Such a device is to be found in the "compensated
dollar", says Dr. Warren. Introduction of such a dollar
would mean the establishment "by law of a currency redeemable
in gold, but the weight of gold for which the dollar would
1. "Prices", G. F. Warren & F. A. Pearson, pp. 163-166.
C
exchange would vary with the index number of wholesale prices of
all commodities; that is, if prices rose one per cent, the weight
of gold for which the dollar would exchange would rise one per
cent. If prices fell one per cent the dollar would exchange for
one pep cent less gold. The gold would be keot in bars in the
Treasury and central banks. This would keep the dollar stable
in buying power for the average of all commodities.""'"
To express the idea mofe simply, the claim is, then, that
changing the bullion dollar will tend to raise prices, "/hen prices
actually rise, the weight of the gold in the dollar will be in-
creased in order to bring | rices down. With the decline of nrices,
the weight of gold in the dollar v/ill be decreased to keep prices
up. The general level or average of .;rices changes. Active business
and employment usually accompany a rising price level , and debts
expand. Banks increase their loans; corporati ns expand their
capital through the sale of bonds; cities, countries, and states
promote the construction of bridges, roads, and public utilities
by bond issues; farmers borrow on mortgage to buy more land and
improve implements; wage and salary earners take out savings to
invest in homes mortgaging heavily.
Declining business activity brings a decrease in business
activity and employment. Values decline; corporations and
1. £f . F. Warren, "Is Our Gold Standard Too Rigid?",
"Forum", April, 1933, Vol. 92, p. 197.
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governments default on their interest; equities
vsnish; while farmers and home owners suffer fore-
closure. Acute social and political unrest are an
inevitable accompaniment of such misfortunes.
In other words, the rise and fall of the orice
level results in soeculative expansion under the
former conditions and deoression under the latter.
Such "oscillations of prosperity" and deoression
would be eliminated if the price level is stabilized
by this commodity dollar device. The exact amount
of change in the gold content of the dollar required
for it to measure so that it will be stable in pur-
chasing power is to be determined by the wholesale
commodity orice index. Observe that he bases his
assumptions on his studies of relationship between
the output of gold and the level of wholesale prices.
He offers no theory of how changes in the price level
are occasioned. And he does not deny or assert that
the immense structure of bank credit built on the
foundation of a small gold base is a factor
that governs wholesale prices.
*
On the question of remonetizat ion of silver, Dr. Warren
expresses the belief that by the adoption of bimetallism
or symetallism it is oossible to set any desired orice
level. Symetallism as oropcsed by the English economist,
Alfred Marshall, is ©referable. His clan Drovides a dollar
that will exchange for some given weight of gold plus a given
weight of silver instead of for 23.22 grains of gold. H e is
confident that since silver production is less erratic then
gold pro
d
uct ion ^nd since two comm odities are more sta le
than one, money of this composition would be more stable
than gold. -*- Once established, it would work just as the
gold standard does and could be used as a basis for the
comoensated dollar.
Somewhat later in explaining his position on reflation more
1. "Prices", G. F. Warren & F. A. Pearson, p. 161

in deteil, Dr. Warren ssys the United States was forced off
the gold standard as surely as w^s England
.
With us domestic
withdrawals from the banks were mere menacing than foreign;
with England, the reverse waa true. Our whole credit structure
from banks to life insurance comoanies was unable to meet the
demands of its creditors. Large numbers of oeople both in
the United State and from foreign countries rushed to con-
vert all their credits to gold causing many credit institu-
tions to becor.e completely insolvent. Between February 28th
and April 17th, the prices of seventeen basic commodities rose
fifteen per cent. By April 19th, we had aband«*^d " all attempt
to keep the dollar at par in foreign exchange, and it immediately
dropped in gold value so that by Aoril 20th s gold ounce
brought $23.20 in London, twelve Der cent above par. Betv/een
April 17th and 20th the average price of seventeen basic
commodities rose twelve per cent.
"At first, the more impcrtant international basic commodities
wheat, lard, cotton, rub er, 8nd copper advanced in price in
gold about the same a? the advance in the price of gold, but
as soon as business began to improve from rising orices, the
usual differences developed between commodities for which de-
mand is fairly stable and commodities for which the demand is
flexible." 1 Betv/een February 28th and ^pril 17th, the nrice
1. G . F. Warren, "The New Dollar"
"Forum", August, 1933, Vol.i&,p. 70.
ni
of wheat advanced twenty-four percent. This is explained
largely by tiie poor conditions of the winter wheat crop and
by the speculative buying which developed in anticipation of
the suspension of the gold standard. The overdepressed market
on February 28th may also explain a part of the rise. On
April 17th ,when the dollar was at par, wheat sold at 62.5^
at Chicago. On June 22nd,v/heat sold at 78.5^ but gold in
London was 18.7 grains to the dollar, making worth 14.7 grains
of gold* Since the price of wheat, then, was fairly stable
in gold, the rise of twenty-five per cer;t was due to depreciation
in the value of the collar. In the last week of June, occurred
a rise relative to gold because of drought conditions.
During the first two days after the suspension of the gold
standard, the price of cotton as well as of gold rose twelve
per cent. As t he price of cotton continued to rise, mills in-
creased their activity. Here a_;ain the expression of the
dollar was operative, together with an increasing demand for
cotton, so that print cloths rose fifty-seven per cent be-
tween April 17th and June 3d. Wool reacteu in much the same
way as cotton.
The prices of silver were inflated by the gold value of the
..ollar and by ';h- P:..:::'. ;ient possibility as. its remonetization.
Silver increased in gold value, but as a whole, it followed
gold rather closely . On April 17th silver was at 23.6^; on
June 22d, at 35.75^. On both dates it took seventy- two
c
Figure V
FIGURE 114.—WHOLESALE PRICES OF ALL COMMODITIES AND THE
COST OF LIVING, 1914-32.
1910-14 - 100.
When prices rose, wholesale prices rose faster than the
cost of living. When prices fell, wholesale prices fell
more rapidly tnan the cost of living.
1. "Prices", G. F. Warren & F. A. Pearson, p. 207
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ounces of silver to buy one ounce of gold* The rise in price,
then, resulted, from the lower value of the cole, dollar.
In explaining the method by which equilibrium will be re-
stored in price structure by reflation, Dr. Warren uses the
following tables.
Table I
Average Prices when 1900-1914 was 100-*-
Feb. May
Wholesale price of all commodities 07 92
Wholesale . rice of thirty basic commodi ties 66 81
Prices paid to farmers for food 51 70
Retail prices of the same 97 103
Costs of distribution of the same 143 133
Wages of farm labor 72
The v/ages of the city laborer varied from 100 to more than
200.
The beginnings of a reflation leading to equilibrium were
evident
.
Table II (adapted)
In iic v; Yor
Feb. 15-L.ay 15 wheat 68^ per bu. 50>o
" " " " wheat on Kansas farms v .28-. 59 per bu. lllg
" * " corn in New York .40-. 61 " 53$
" " " " corn in Nebraska p .12-. 30 150%
1. 0. F. ,/arren, "The New Dollar"
"Forum" (August, 1933), Vol.. 92,, p. 71.
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Figure VI
FIGURE 167 . - -WHOLESALE PRICES AND CIRCULATION PER CAPITA
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1843-61.
As is usual, an increased circulation per capita was fol-
lowed by a rise in prices and a decreased circulation by
a decline in prices.
1. "Prices", G . F. Warren & F. A. Pearson, p. 346
<
A considerably preater reduction in the value of the dollar
than that would be necessary to restore equilibrium. "To bring
to rise fifty per cent above ] _ re -war prieea before farm prices
can come Into adjustment with retail rices and costs of dis-
trlfeution*- Y/hen farm prices are at 50; retail at 100 and
costs of distribution at 150, a rise in prices restores equili
brivm . "~
Dr. 7/arren has discovered that the longtime trend of wages
in the United States is tO
i
rise in purchaship pov;er at the
rate of 1.71/a a year or about the
i
same as the normal increase
in out;; lit of commodities per capita. 5 But the buying power of
wages is, of course, dislocated by either inflation or deflation.
"If the pro-war trend of wapes had continued to 1954 and if
T iole sale prices iad remained at the 1910-1914 level, or 100,
wa_os should be expected to 1--4, v; :. ch is the normal increase
in rchas np power in 21.5 years. If the wholesale prices
should return to the 1926 level, wages would be expected to be
216 . A restoration of the commodity price level will radually
bring approximate equilibrium in wape ra es of different kinds
of work. If wholesale prices of all commodities are restored
to the 192P level and the cost-of-living index is somewhat
1. G. F. "'srren, "The New Dollar"
,
"Forum", (August, 1933), Vol. 92, p. 71
2. Ibid, p. 72.
3. "Prices", G . F. barren & F. A. Pearson, p. 197.
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higher than the all commodity index, but some what lower than
it was in 1929, as is to be expected--it is probable that the
general level of all v/a^es will return approximately to the
1926 level."1 Farm labor will go to that level; construction
will not.
Can v;e return to the Old Dollar? Professor Warren answers
no because the credit structure cannot stand the strain and
the social structure will not tolerate it. When prices were
forty to one hundred per -ent above pre-war prices^ our vrtiole
debt and price structure finally came into adjustment with
high prices, o.ue to the reduced dei.and for gold* Later, how-
ever, when several other nations tried to resume the pold
standard and we at e- ted to mai. tain our _ re -war currency, we
had bo face a colla_ se in commodity rices not related to a
business cycle or similar to any other in history , be carried
more deflation thereafter since the depression than any
nation in hi story. Before too reat a chaos resulted in our
proceos of adjustment we were forced off the ;^old standard .
If we should return to the Old Dollar, we should return to the
chaotic condition from which we escaped in abandonninc, cold.
— —^ - i- — ——
i
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"The only alternative to the reduction of debt and price
structure to the value of gold is to revalue the dollar so as
to raise the price structure to the level to which debts, taxes
1. G. F. Warren, "The New Dollar",
"Forum" (August, 1933), Vol.. 92, p. 72.

Figure VII '
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FIGURE 184.—PRICES OF 17 BASIC COMMODITIES AND THE
PRICE OF GOLD,
April 18 to June 10, 1933.
Prices of basic commodities rose more than the advance
in the price of gold.
1. "Prices'*, G. F. V/arren & F. A. Pearson, p. 384

and. other charges are most nearly adjusted
Although a s explained^ by 1928 ^ the world's supply of =old
had increased, thirty -e I.ght per cent over the pre - 1914 level,
the world's phys'cal volume of all commodi ties had accumulated
less rapidly than normal even though it was also thirty-eight
per cent more than before the war. It is reasonable to ex-
pect pre-war prices as soon as the demand for gold reasserts
itself. The crash in price structure came shortly after
France resumed her currency on a gold basis • The world
rnld su'ooly is adequate for ^re-war orices under normal con-
dlti ons; the world ::e~:and for the metal has not abated and
will no doubt continue insistent for several years • It may
be predic t ed, safely that prices in any country attempting
to mai ntain its pre -war currency w." 11 average below pre-war
g rice s f or the
i
next decade . The present gold production is
only about three-fourths of the required amount. To meet
conditions will require a price decrease of one per cent per
year. The present world supply of gold and world goods - pro-
moti on require^ pre-war prices in re-war currency with a
gradual decline until new sources of g
o
Id sup ; .
l
y are opened
up_. H<:J I nee our debt, tax, ana -r.'-ce structure is adjusted to
a pric e level about forty per cent above pre-war, the world
1 4 G. F. Warren, "The New Dollar",
"Forum" (august, 1933), vol. 92, p. 73.
2. Ibid.^ P. 73
f
60
-old sup'oly is wholly inadequate for our needs if we attempt
to restore _ ro-war currency. 1
!
The rise in - 'rice level lias resulted from the decline in
old value of the dollar , not from currency, credit, or overn-
nent control of a ri culture and industry * All these factors
deve loped later • None c an succeed except as the gold content
of the dollar is reduced to the right amount. No other measure
is necessary to effec t the rice rise . "if there had been
any intention of restoring the Old Dollar there would have
been no point to the invalidation of the gold clause. If an
attempt were made, the results of the resumption of inflation
would q .ickly cause such a credit and s ocial reaction as to
bring drastic if not radical legislation *"
The problem of revaluation of the dollar is an internal
problem of restoring a balance in prices, taxes, and debts
and of reerplov'cnt. International considerations should be
subordinated and should not be allowed to it erfere with a
d 0
1
. .esti c p
r
o
;
ram
.
England is really too deflationary, and
we should disregard her insistent demand that we shall not re-
duce as much as they.
It must be remembered that in order to raise prices Wwrt
agriculturalists receive to their normal percentage and to
1. G. F. Warren, "The New Dollar",
"Forum" (August, 1933), Vol. 92, p. 73.
2. Ibid v p. 73

establish a readjustment of prices of what they buy with what
they sell, the wholesale price level must be raised to a level
higher than the 1926 level. Of course, the higher we can
force the -rice level, the more rapidly we shell stimulate re-
employment. Such a orice level must be attained as will
restore equities in city homes end in farms, or bankruDtcies
will continue. Prices of commodities follow changes in the
price of gold; if the price of gold rises fifty per cent whole-
sale commodity prices will rise five per cent
.
Professor Warren's theory of the rate of price change is
that since basic commodity prices were low they will change
quicker and will first be restored and then outrun the average
of all for a time . The average of all commodity prices changes
slowly, but gradually attains adjustment . Retail prices will
rise by a mu ch smaller percentage .
At the time he explained his economic theories in the above
terms, Dr. ".'arren believed thfl* a dollar reduced by one third
or the price of gold raised fifty per cent would result in
gradual recovery, but said that the Committee of the Nation
recommended a raise in the price of gold to seventy-five per
cent or reduction in the gold content of the dollar of 42.8
per cent which would make the dollar worth 15.27 grains of gold.
A reduction to the legal limit, he believed, would result in
some inflation.
t•
_
A clear impression of Professor Warren la stand on the buy-
ing of gold in the world market as a means of raising the
price of gold and his method of operation may be gained from
the following passage in his address December 28, 1933 before
the American Economic Association.
"The influence of raisin.^ the price of gold on basic com-
modity prices depends on whether the amount of gold required
to buy commoaities is changing,
"1. If a country raises the buying price of gold at
about the same rate as the gold value of basic coram odi ties
falls, it will maintain approximately stable commodity prices.
T ds was the experience of England and Sv/eden and many other
c ountri e s f or ab out two yo ar s
.
"2. If a country raises the buying price of gold at a
time v/hen the gold value of basic commodities is stable, prices
will rise in proportion to the advance in the .rice of gold.
This has been the experience of the United States for six
months
•
"3. If a country raises the buying price of gold at a time
v/hen the gold value of basic commodities is rising, the price
of commodities will rise more ra idly than the price of gold
advances
.
w4. If a country lowers the buying price of ,;old at a time
when the gold value of basic commodi ties is rising it will
c
increase the rapidity of the decline in commodity prices."
The principal monetary doctrines^ of Dr. Warren as expressed
in iiis writings before he became a member of the Brain Trust
as well as since that time maybe summarized as follows:
1. I.Ioney is both a medium of exchange and a commodity.
Bitmetallism and syme talli sm are practical.
2. To maintain ar. ordered economic life, a stable level of
wholesale rices is necessary.
3. When prices are not stable gold is at fault. There is
«
a direct r elation between prices and the demand for and supply
of Oola and the demand for and supply of commodities offered
for sale. When demana and supply remain relatively constant,
prices bear a direct r elationship to t he dollar price of gold?
4. Since 1925 there has arisen an abnormal aemand for
gold which has depressed prices ":elow the level at which manu-
facture and tracie can be developed at a profit. A prime and
intensifying factor in t lis deflationary trend has been the
fixed weight of the dollar.
5. To change the price level there must be a change in
the value of money. A gold buying policy which arbitrarily
1. "New York Times" (Dec. 29, 1933), p. 16.
Willard
2. Atkins, "Gold and Your Money",
pp. 156 ft
4
3. Barnes, Harry Llmer, "l.loney Changes vs. the New Deal",
pp 88-89.
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and artificially raises the price of the dollar of gold will
lower the gold price of the dollar. To express it differently,
change the weight of gold in the dollar or its price per
ounce
.
6. No attempt is made to present a theory of how changes
in the price level come about, rather he base's his hypothesis
on an observed relationship between the output of gold and
the level of wholesale prices. The part played by our great
structure of bank credit built on a small gold base 8S a
factor governing wholesale price he doe-3 not deny or ex-
plicitly recognize.
7. nfter the required amount of depreciation has been
attained, the dollar may be officially devalued to harmonize
with that amount of depreciation; that is, if goal of
depreciation is fifty per cent, the Droporticnate devaluation
would necessitate a reduction of the gold content of the
dollar to one half of its present weight (Jan. 1934)
.
8. Reflation, or a gradual but certain rise of prices
to the level w ; ich is the goal of those controlling the
monetary policy, will be coincident with and follow de-
preciation and devaluation.
9. After the desired orice level is secured, stabilization
should be attempted by such devices as the commodity dollar,
the compensated gold dollar, or an amalgam that will be altered
in value in relation to the orice trends.

10. In a process of monetary reorganization and financial
preparation for recovery, tne normal process should be depre-
ciation, devaluation, reflation, stabilization.
%
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PART V
Current Impressions of the Mone tary
Doctrines of
Dr. George Frederick V'arren

Within the year much comment has been made on the doc-
trines .<?nd Dolicies of Dr. Warren pertaining to monetary
matters. Selecting the published discussions of some of
the most reliable, typical, and broadly representative a-
mong them, we shall investigate the opinions ' f a statisti-
cian, the Dean of the Graduate School of Yale, a monetary
expert called to the service of the Rank of England, econo-
mists, and college professors, lie shall begin with an
analysis or summary of Dr. Furniss
'5 ideas as exoressed
in a recent number of the "Yale Review." Dr. Sprague's
theories of causes of the depression, of monetary matters,
of methods of recovery, and of probable future influences
of the Warren doctrines will next be summarized. There will
follov; an analysis of the commodity index number and compensa-
ted dollar as developed by Warren and Pearson from the point
of view of Dr. Tucker and comments in rejoinder by Dr. Wbel-
den. The point of view of the statistician we shall get
from Bassett Jones.
(
DR. FURNISS'S IDEAS ON CURRENT MONETARY MATTERS
AND RECOVERY
i.Iost people concede that the justice of existing economic
relationships between individuals and sccial classes, between
^ebtor and creditor, between laborer and employer, and between
parties to long-term contracts, presupposes as firm a degree
of stability as possible in the money value unit. The signifi-
cance of this value unit, the "new dollar", to business enter-
prise and to the ordinary citizen is determined by its purchas-
ing power; and it is proposed by the monetary experts to control
the fluctuations of the unit by stabilizing the general level of
prices. Evils arising in the existing economic relations of the
groups mentioned result, it is said, from the diverse behavior
of individual items in the price structure during periods of
general change. Since complete plasticity does not exist, the
equilibrium among various factors of the economic system is
disturbed by deviation of specific prices from the general
average. This change in price level dislocates the balance
c
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between cost and income upon which modern economic arrangements
among individuals and social groups are based. Some prices re-
sponded with a degree of alacrity to current economic forces,
but such factors as lav/, organized opposition < f interested
groups, or the inertia of custom retard the adjustment of other.
Grounds for challenge of the policy of the experts and by the
way, there are net supposed to be more than sixteen English
speaking people competent to understand what is to happen in
the manipulation of the currency which is the affect a genera-
tion tc come, lie in the following conditions. In a capitalist
society, it ia impossible to regulate each of the myriad indivi-
dual i tems c omp o s i nj^ the pric e system s o that they will..all .vary
directly and proportionate ly wi th one another . Further
n
"in a
s oci ety of free ent r-rprise it is inexpedient even if it were
practicable: for variation of individual trices in relation to
one an: cher is .the _ factor upon which we rely to indicate the
chan;-:in£: uti lity of different kinds of goods and services , to
distribute labor among the various ecupatiens with some regard
to their relative social importance, co accelerate or retard the
accumulation of capital and direct it into profitable channels
of investment; in short, to govern the complex economic endeavor
of a planless society with reference to immediate and prospective
needs •"•^
1. Edgar L. Furniss, "Reflections on the 7 "ew Dollar",
"Yale -teview'jVoi SS^areh, 1934; p. 451-
*(
It is the intention of the advocates of managed, currency,
while controlling the average 6f all prices, to leave each
Commodity and service free to fluctuate in value in response
to current market forces. It is assumed that these natural
changes in the ratios of specific prices will not disturb the
equilibrium among the separate parts of the price structure
upon which the plans cf both individuals and business groups
are based; or that if such disturbances do occur, they will
be slight in extent and in harmony With social welfare. These
experts believe that the stabilization cf the price average will
remove the one prime cause of periodic dislocations of the eco-
nomic system; and that the unequal flexibility of individual
prices which has been the immediate source of our difficulty
in times of general price change, will cease tc have further
significance for the reason that general changes of price never
occur. Many economi sts deny all possibility of stabilizing the
price level, sayinp- that all previous schemes have failed . Ad-
vocates agree on the essential principles of a successful scheme,
but differ radically in methods. They base all their procedures
for controlling a change in price average cn the same scientific
law regarding the purchasing power of money and agree on the use
cf the device known as "index number" to determine the price
average and record its movements.
r•
Several factors tend tc make the uetermining of the "index
number" a complicated technical process lacking in validity
and reliabil ity* First, it is impossible to compute for all
items in the market; so the procedure resolves itself into a
selection of certain basic or outstanding commodities and as-
suming that their prices are representative of all the others*
Furthermore, it will be vitally necessary to attempt to give
each of the goods and services selected a weight in the average
in proportion to its human significance. But some items ori-
ginally "indexed" will become obsolete and new groups of prices
of socially important goods will arise. Such changea will have
a varied affect on the welfare of different citizens and social
groups . "Any s ingle *index number^, however carefully its com-
ponents are se lecte d and weighted must be an abstraction relat-
ing to a hypoth etical average citizen and not to the real ne eds
and act i vities of l ivi ng human beings.. It will be possible
to so misdirect the attempt t' stabilize the price level with
respect to the index that the c< ntribution to human welfare
over a period of tine will be slight, even negative. Further
evidences of unreliability lie in' the fact that. the experts do
n ot agree as to the validity of each other 's determination of
the "index number".
%• idgar L. Furniss, "Reflections on the New Dollar",
"Yale Review" #ol 2^iarch, 1934; p. 454.

So Professe r Furniss insists that net one but several "index
numbers" must be c imputed , each to reflect the changes in one
facto r or .group of factors in the problem* "Index numbers
must be flexible, subject to alteration bcth as regards the
component parts and the relative weights of these items in
adjustment tc the continuous flux of economic institutions
and activities.—Making and revising "index numbers" demands
the exercise of JLns
i
ght« discriminating judgment, and expert
knowledge wh ich the ordinary administrative officers of a
government can no more hope to possess than the average citi-
zen. --Political pressure of all sorts will be brought to bear
since in making and revisingjthe indexes affect selfish inter-
ests of individuals and groups in such a way as to render it
inevitable."-'- At present, "index numbers" are considered good,
but it is intended^ .to. .app_ly_ .them..in a rnuch broaaer manner in
business and industrial affairs
..pj^yojl^.. JlAX?2L their present
validity and reliability warrant*
Only a dictatorship of the wisest men can grapple with such
problems, whereupon there immediately arise misgivings as to
the political practicability of the plan, in view of the other
-uties of monetary dictators. The economist is impelled to add
other Queries. Hog i s it possible to organize administrative
1. Edgar L . Furniss, "Reflections on the Hew Dollar",
"Yale Review", Vol. 23, .March, 1934; p.. 456.
oc
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machinery in such a manner _as_ to assure c ompetent officials
,
endowed wi th adequate auth ority and .safeguarded a,,ainst pol-
itical influence over a prolonged period? Supposing it is
possible to satisfy that condition, what shall be the pro-
cedure in the future by which a popular review of such dic-
tators may be achieved at election times, without destroying
their authority and independence? After establishing an
"index number", what specific measures should be taken to
force the return of a price level wandering from the base?
Experts are still vigorously debating this point.
Professor Furniss stresses the point that the Quantity
Theory of Money is nc longer valid. The implication of the
theory is that an undesired change in the irice level can
be controlled ana eve n reversed by regulating the amount of
currency in circulation . In the two hundred years elapsing
since the presentation of the theory, commercial banking has
greatly expanded and bank deposits form common currency;
the direct relation between the quantity of primary mc ney
ana the level of prices no longer exists. l;ormal expansion
and contraction of the currency develop through the banks
so that devices for managing the monetary system must be
concerned v/ith the increase <v decrease of deposits.
o
..'ith respec t tc the regulation of th e gol u content of the
d ollar, Professor Furniss asserts that it may .have, some in-
fluence upon long-run « slow-moving changes of price level «
but emphasi zes the fac t that such an expedient is ineffective
f or a method of control for short time * or emergency periods *
He believes that the exercise of such a device presupposes an
organization v/hich will bring bank deposits under centralized
contr< 1 and alsc that "the actual condition of the nv ney mar-
ket will always be such that the central authority will be
able by ordinary business procedures to regulate the credit
operations of the individual banks." 1 As an illustration of
the necessary organization by statute which alone will make
possible the use of this expedient, is cited the lav/ impound-
ing the gold supply in the Federal Treasury v/hich vests the
President with powers pertinent to the stabilizing currency
and provides a completely centralized control of the national
gold reserves , together with the power to determine and rede-
termine within limits the number of dollar units contained in
the reserves by the procedure of changing the definition of
the dollar in terms of it.s gold content. The statute further-
more creates an immense gold fund for the transaction inde-
pendently of the money assigned to existing bank reserves
1. Edgar L. Furniss, "Reflections on the New Dollar",
"Yale Review", Vol.- 2 r6 y ijar.ch, .1934; ._p m 457.
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which the government may use to maintain any money policy it.
may choose
.
_he task of planning a no. aurainistering such a aevice would
constitute a proolcm ve ry few government officials or econo-
mists are capao le of. ^very day such a body would have to de-
cide what specific measures of control to apply and at the same
time plan to prevent the money market as a whole from getting
out of hana. "The ability of a central authority to control
the credit operations of uanks by manipulating the discount
rate or oy means of operations in the open market depends upon
a combination of circumstances concerning the condition of the
central and the member banks, the state of the Investment and
exchange market, the temper of the business world. 'with all
this successfully negotiated, the heart of the problem will
still be unsolved.
i..ore promptly responsive devices would be open market oper-
ation ana alteration of the discount rate since they would af-
fect the reserves of the banks and influence tne willingness
of the bankers to expand deposits and of business men to bor-
row them.
in definition of the stabilized price level, the professor
states that .resident Roosevelt's first policy implied a
1. Cdgar L • Furniss, "Reflections on the New Dollar",
"Yale Review", Vol. 33, March, 1934; p. 45y.
c
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commodity dollar to be given a constant purchasing power, a
price level fixed and unchanging, but that later he modified
the term tc mean a "reasonable stability of prices." The >?
first objective, he believes, would aggravate evils intended
to be rem. ved. In the years immediately preceding lt>29, the
United States actually had what might be called a "reasonable
stability of prices." His inference from a study of th e per-
iod and the "index numb ers" as published by the Bureau of
Lab or Statistics of t:cse years, is that the re lative rigid -
ity cf orice average during the years 1521-1930 and 192
-
192:
was a ec n
t
ributary eaaae cf the breakdown • He explains his
^ position :*.n the following terms. "Injury results from gen-
eral price change n< t because the average is shifting but
because individual prices do net move in harmony with one
ancther.—Economic factors play upon groups of goods and
services changing their relative positions within the price
structure causing the value f some to fall through the in-
fluence of technological progress and similar cost reducing
.evelopments and because of diminution of demand, and caus-
ing others tc rise in value for similarly fundamental reasons.
"
-
Maint enance of a constant general price level wj uld not pre-
v ent these price change s , but would require that they be off-
s et by compensating mo vement s so that prices would be raised
in some as they fa ll in othe rs, thus producing a more serious
distortion within the price structure than if nothing had been
f
d one at all* --If agricultural prices recline because of forces
in international market and not controlled by the monetary pol-
icy in the United States, agricultural areas will suffer unless
prices that define their costs (industrial prices, interest and
wage rates, transportation charges, etc.} move in the same down-
ward direc tion .
-
-Effort t< Mainta in a constant price leve l would
offer resistance tc any tendency of the se cond gr oup of price s
to fall with the falling commodity group .—To be effective, the
policy must drive the second group in the opposite direction
from the first in order to correct the average, thus increasing
the gap between farmer^-s incomes and their costs which v/ould
undermine economic security of a large part of the population.
—The trend may be in the opposite direction, tc the immediate
injury of the industrial group.—Since sweeping price movements
in different kinds of goods are inevitable, a constant general
price level far from acting as a safeguard to the welfare of
sectional or class interests is likely to add to the misfor-
tunes of these already damaged."'*'
In place f the stable price level Professor Furniss advo-
cates, the "stabilizing price level" which the ec onomist Keynes
c alls the "equilibrium price level", such a price level aa will
keen things in balance . He defines the stable price level as
1. Edgar L. Furniss, "Reflections on the Hew Dollar",
"Yale :eview",Vol. 23, March, 1934; P. .460.
c
"one which fluctuates in order to maintain equilibrium among
the changing factors in the economic system. "1 The stable
dollar he defines as "one whose fluctuation of physical con-
tent produces constancy of purchasii g power." 2
According to Dr. Furniss's theory of prices, the fact that
prices arrive at a certain average at any given time, or over
a considerable period of time, is no assurance that a perpetu-
ation of that condition will maintain equilibrium within the
economic system. Beneath the apparent stability of a constant
or slow-moving price average, fundamental changes in the system
o f production may be going on which may tend to produce cumulative
maladjustments which will finally disrupt the system . In a
developing economic order like ours, the price level to act
as a stabilizer must move in accord with fundamental trends.
When technological progress tends to reduce costs of produc-
tion the price level should fall in conformity with the al-
tered conditions. Failures, at first imperceptible, of the
g neral price level to fluctuate with production costs will
result in a disequilibrium that will cuse trouble.
Monetary experts, then, not in agreement on their goal,
cannot safely take the first steps in the programme of price
control. The political practicability of the device of the
1. Edgar L. Furniss, "Reflections on the New Dollar",
"Yale Review," Vol. 23 March, 1934 p. 462.
2. Ibid, p. 462.
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equilibrium price level even, which is preferable from the
point of view of social welfare, is doubtful. The problem
cf solution cf the method is immensely difficult. This de-
vice presuppose a breadth of knowledge and a profundity <
f
insight which few even of our Brain Trusters possess. Pol-
itical agitation will arise from the selfish interests of
individuals and classes, j ur political history apes no t
seem t o teach that suc h a device is a feasible task of gcv -
ernment in a representative democracy
<
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In concluding his reflections on the subject of govern-
mental determination of a general price level, Professor
Furniss states that the people of the T ~nited States should
demand that no thing be attempted in the way of fixing the
"numb er index" and the commodity dollar upon us until _the
problem cf administrative organization has been s c lved.
He does hot believe their administration should be vested
in the President or in the Secretary cf the Treasury. In
that case, the final authority w< uld be the President who
would not always be c mpetent and wh<: is always primarily
a party leader. Not scientific economics, but sectional
and partisan pclitics W< uld then be in ccntr 1 of the policy
more times than n^ t. He also rejects the Federal Reserve
Beard as ptssible arbiter since it has < ften been character-
ized by divided counsels and vacillating decisions, is
r
80
vulnerable to political attack, ana its present personnel is de-
termined by a law passed in response to sectional pressure. To
carry out such a policy the United states needs a body of masters,
not advisers, comparable to the Elder statesmen of oapan, an idea
which i_s foreign to our political habits » They should oe experts
entirely removed from politics with aosolute authority in their
field ana accountable to no one out themselves. To carry out
their plans they could utilize the existing machinery of government
and they must co-operate with the ,ecretary of the Treasury and
the Federal He serve ..oard. father than to cause fai lure through,
faulty aamini strati on it would be \; iser to discard the policy at
an early date . A second aemand the people should make v/ith re-
spect to impending operation of the policy is that the dictators
be content with slow ana cautious progress in their programme .
They should aoandon the notion that it is possible to select
1926 or any other single year ana to require by law that the
price level be established at that point. And the enabling act
should confer a oroad grant of powers without such hampering re-
striction.
t
DR. SPRAGUE 1 S IDEAS ON THE DEPRESSION, CURRENT
MONETARY POLICIES, AND RECOVERY
In the opinion of Profess r Sprague the depression is not
due to monetary causes, and no monetary p< licy v/ill be suffi-
cient to bring about trade recovery. To him the commodity
dollar is an "intriguing but pernicious product of statistical
ingenuity". 1 Granting a stimulating effect to business of a
general rise in prices, he admonishes the government official
to discover, before attempting to put any plan into operation,
whether it v/ill stimulate desirable activities that can be
i a inta in ed . A dec line in price s of le ss than twenty-five per
cent occurred "o e tw e e n IS 28 -IS33 ; s c a really far-s ighted pc licy
of recovery should bo directed toward _increasing v< lume in the
case < f most industrial roduct s
,
delaying tc a future date an
advance in prices after trade recovery has made greater progress .
A fifty per cent increase in the general price level might be
advantage '.us , but it should be determined that th< se commodities
1. ( . M. V/. Sprague, "Recovery and Common Sense", p. 2.
2. Ibid, p. 14.
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in which a great increase in pr ducticn and consumption is
anticipated shall rise in price less than the average < f com-
er dities in general.
. he g Id purchasing policy of the government based on the
asBumptic n that price level is directly respr nsive to change s
in value of American m< ney relative to the value
-
o f the curren-
c ies of other countries., will not at the present time develop
a rise in prices that will persist and be accompanied by a full
employment of labor and a higher standard f living, although
over a long period these results might be cssible. An intense
demand for additional credit and currency must be the initiat-
ing factor in stimulating an advance in prices. Two other con-
ditions must also be present. HBanks must not have reached
limits of expansion of credit and currency fixed by statutory
ratio cf reserves which they must hold against liabilities
.
And they must be willing to meet the increased demand made
upon them for accommodation whether it be from business or
from the government." 1 Furthermore, cur prese nt, supply of
money is adec uate to suppo rt a much higher price level , since
our gold basis for credit is (in early 1934) far greater than
in 192G. It is possible that an expansion of a monetary base
that is already sufficient may bring expansion and a more ef-
fective distribution of credit and currency, but it will have
1. . I • Sprague, "Recovery and Common Sense", p. 3i .
c
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little definite influence. Professor Sprague gives point to
!iis theory by a brief survey of the wholesale price index and
the stock of money in circulation between 1926 and 1933. "Be-
tween 192"' and 1£33 the wholesale price index of the Bureau of
Labor declined from 100 to below 70. In June, 192f>, the stock
of money in circulation was estimated at $4,885,000,000. By
June, 1933, there had been an increase to $5,720, 000 , 000. Dur-
ing the same period of time there was an increase in the cash
reserves of the Federal Reserve Banks from $2,980,000,000 to
33,813, COO, COO." 1 He concludes that "Evidently, if the supply
of money whether in the hands of the people or in the Reserve
Banks, always exerted a powerful direct influence on prices,
we ought now to be enjoying a far higher price level than that
of 1926. "^ The actual decline in prices is and was partly
caused by a very great decrease in the loans and investments
of the .'jnerican banks. To reac
,
Rie 1'-' price level \:here
must be an immense increase in the loans and investments^ _of
American oanks with • resultant crease in the volume of de-
posits sub j ect to check. Lack of confidence of the pec pie in
the banks and the currency have greatly handicapped the re-
covery. All classes of people must bear the blame for the
severity of debacle: the thou: and s of farmers who bid up the
1. . :.!. '/. Sprague, "Recovery and Common Sense", ). 34.
2. Ibid, p. 34.
rc
land and then mortgaged heavily, industrialists who ever-ex-
panded, investment bankers, and even some economists v/ho pro-
claimed a new era before it had arrived. The Federal he serve
System should have exercised a wise restraint from 1^27 to
1929* Commercial bankers should net have adopted the policy
of their clients.
The temporary insurance plan Profess- r Sprague believes
should prcve an effective means of establishing confidence
in the banks and make it possible vo attempt a more enter-
prising lending po.licy* Bankers have been urged to a freer
extension of credit, but examiners have subjected "existing
assets tc valuations based on most pessimistic forecasts" ,
-
1-
v/hich has been a deflationary influence. It is questicnable
whether there is any public advantage from the insurance of
large deposits; it would seem preferable tc limit insurance
to cover deposits of $2500 or some other ccmparatively small
amount • A second deflat ionary influence has resulted from the
liquidati on of clo sed banks . Business enterprise has been
seriously checked by the pressure exerted by receivers on bor-
rowers and in the disposal of investments v/hen bank failures
-./ere numerous. The prospect that the assets of banks more re-
cently closed will be taken ever for slow liquidation by the
1. C. M. W. Sprague, "Recovery and Common Sense", p. 39.
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government and a measure i f immediate distribution be made tc
depositors will probably prove to be the most "serviceable and
pervasive" of all means adopted by the government in employing
funds to assist recovery.
As to the Securities ."ct, burdensome nd unreasonable pro-
visions m st be eliminated t( remove another important obstacle
tc an enterprising lending policy for the banks since seme
features of the original form distinctly obstructed the movement
of savings through normal investment channels to industry.
Distrust and uncertainty of currency conditions have forced
the banks to maintain a condition of extreme liquidity. Under
these conditions depositors withdraw their deposits and borrow
on their insurance policies in order to buy tangible property
and equities, or t:.ey export their savings to foreign countries
for safety. 'Vith respect to the monetary policies erf Professor
Sarrfen adopted by the government, the Harvard economist states
that the failure of measures of depreciation to be effective
h as net convinced their proponents that the course was wrong
,
but merely th a t str onger measures were needed • Difficulties
in the path wr.ich the influence of revaluation of the dollar
will exert in bringing on a trade recovery and a rise in prices
are very numerous. Failure to make the distinction between
permanent monetary arrangements and policies to meet immediate
c<
needs characterizes current efforts in that direction. He
further points out that an uncritical acceptance of the in-
creased--consumer--purchasing--power thee ry characterized
an unwarranted telerant attitude on the part of the National
Recovery Administration toward increasing costs and prices.
Major points in Professor Sprague's criticism of the de-
preciation policy are as follows. There was no evidence
whateve r that the American Icllar was overvalued re lativ e
t o foreign currencies at the time we abandoned the gold
s tandard . There is no basis for the contention that cur pol-
icy is the same as that of Great Britain. Various influences
tending to depreciate t:,e dollar will tend to bring about its
appreciation when the government decides to stop depreciation.
"To hold the dollar at any particular point of depreciation
will prove wholly impracticable unless prices shall have risen
in the meantime to a level roughly apprc ximating the deprecia-
tion which is desired to make permanent* <
There is no instanc e of any other country' s de parture from
th ^old standard when its cur re
n
cy wa s n t overvalued at the
time £-:old Payments were discontinued; so we attempted a radi-
cal policy under conditions contrary tc tradition. The United
States had a favorable balance of international payments, was
1. 0. M. W. Sprague, "Recovery and Common Jense'^p. 51
r
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a large creditor country, possessed a comparatively snail
amount of foreign balances payable on demand, and our Federal
e serve Banks had one half billion dollars in gold. ' bviously
the United States could maintain the gold standard, but cur
government believed depreciation would help trade, recovery I
The ten per cent depreciation of Hay and June, 1933, became
inadeouate in duly; so that month and August saw a twenty per
cent (approximated depreciation. A still further depreciation
occurred. in October and later became forty per cent. Because
ur dollar was hot overvalued at parity, "the strong arm"
method of the Thomas Amendment was adopted to enforce depre-
ciation, but the result was only a decline of ten per cent by
June. Believing that trade recovery v/ould be hastened by co-
operation with other countries with the objective f the early
establishment of international monetary stability, the govern-
ment sent a special commission to the V/orld Economic Conference,
but independent of it, at London, to negotiate on the matter.
So far our governmental policy did not seem tc be extreme
,
but in June c ame a decided change in the monetary policies of
the Admin is tration ; measures adopted at the conference were
abandoned and the intention to establish a new monetary system
based on the commodity dollar wag ann - unced . "The psychological
r#
effect of this unexpected change in policy was reflected in a
further weakening of the dollar increasing the depreciation
to some thing like twenty per cent." 1 This depreciation, how-
ever, did not rest on a firm foundation, and there were evid-
ences of a tendency to reverse the course and to appreciate.
More determined action was taken in October when the Admini-
stration announced its programme of purchasing gold both at
home and abroad at prices that would be determined daily at
Washington. Sufficient speculation against the dollar and
flight from the dollar has occurred which has made it un-
necessary for the government to make heavy gold purchases
in foreign markets.
.hat influences on prices are to be anticipated by depre-
ciating dollarv So far as the policy of setting up a monetary
system that will be independent of monetary movements and price
fluctuations in other countries has developed, it influences
our own situation only through the changes it makes in monetary
relations between the United States and other countries. Con-
trary to the usual process
,
depreciation has preceded expansion
in our case, whereas usually currencies depreciate as a result
of excessive credit and currency expansion . The obstinacy of
the dollar in depreciating results from the fact that a rise
1. 0. M. W. Sprague
,
"Recovery and Common Sense", p. 49.
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of pri ces ha s occurred he re while there has been no s imilar
movement in other eountr ie s . ""Instead f a depreciation merely
registering a price situation which had already been reached,
we are seeking to reach a desired situation through the in-
fluence that depreciation may exert on rices."^ Aside from
speculation, the first immediate influence cur changing dollar
can exert on prices concerns large volume ccmmc dities of for-
eign trade, either experts or imports. But even then rise in
prices in Amer ican currency may be offse t by a decl ine^ in .for-
e ign geld prices. Only through indirect effect, then, dees the
increased dollar price influence >rices in general and nly by
this means may we anticipate any movement of prices of any consequence.
Another fac t r contributory to th e inadequacy of dollar deprecia-
ti on as a pric e-raising measure in our country is th e comparatively
small percentage of exports tc our total production . Again , an
influence on prices appears when depreciation has taken place
sufficiently to make possible to expert goods which may enter
foreign markets in competition with goods in other countries.
In the case of manufactured products, if depreciation occurs
in the absence of an equivalent rise in the prices of those,
goods, the widening range would permit the finding of profitable
markets outside the country, but would be checked by the lowering
1. f . :~. 7. Sprague, "e.ecovery and Common Sense", p. 53.
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of prices by the foreign producer and also by the imposition
of additional tariff duties. The slight influences exerted
by dollar depreciation toward raising prices will be more than
offset by internal influences unfavorable to it ana that will
strengthen if the further depreciation of the dollar is not
discarded . The claim that the New Deal policies of the govern-
ment made it necessary to abandon the gold stanaara ana adopt
dollar depreciation seems to have no sound basis * Higher duties
would have given better returns in the attempt to safeguard those
policies from the destructive influence of foreign competition.
A positive deflationary influence exists alongsiae these lessen-
ing influences of the depreciating dollar on prices. "The bank-
ing ana business community, therefore, is hesitant oecause it
naturally fears that when the Varren programme of depreciation
of the dollar is seen to be ineffective, the administration, in-
stead of reverting to reasonably sane monetary policies, will
either experiment with devaluation at the present or lower value
of the dollar, as expressed in the price of gold or resort to
positive inflationary measures. "1
Let us next consider Professor Sprague 1 s views on tne influ-
ence devaluation of the dollar will exert on trade recovery and
1. 0. M. W. Sprague, "Recovery and Common ;3ense", p. 60.
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a rise of prices. Devaluation is usually the last stage in
the return of a distorted currency tc the geld standard and
is the statutory recognition that prices have advanced far
beyond the level which can be maintained if the old arity is
restored* In devaluing the American dollar tc the extent of
its present depreciation, we assume that devaluation in itself
will result rapidly in the necessary rise in prices. The_ re_-
valued currency would arriv e at e quilibrium with those
;
f other
c ountries only after the price raise. 7e can no longer revalue
in concert with foreign nations, Great Britain in particular,
since our dollar measured in foreign currencies is now clearly
undervalued. ' ther nations will probably net take similar
action. The ri sk of American devaluati-.n with a poss ibility
of much greater foreign devaluation is too unwise and too dan-
g£E22§,« Such action on the part of foreign countries would be
inevitable if American prices did not rise decidedly after the
revaluation. Serious financial and monetary difficulties ore
implicit in devaluation to the present state f depreciation.
Under certain cond iti ons American c ap ital
,
t.hp. i ntHnw
.&£_. m i oh
h as be en a larg factor contributi ng to the existing deprecia-
tion, will begin to ret urn, and gold imports migh t increase to
such an extent as to threaten the departu y_ ^ bi e gold standard
of countrie s stil l on to-gether w ith a startling aecline of
«(
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currencies on a paper basis . As for the field of prices, de -
valuation will not increase the consumer purchasing power in
the least . It would mean an increase in dollar holdings of
gold in the united Jtates Treasury anu in the i'ederal Reserve
danks to tne extent of between two or tnree billions. The
government would tnen make a heavy profit of that amount which
it could expend on public welfare without the resort to taxa-
tion or loa-iS. The effect of tiie release of this amount through
governmental cnannels cannot oe precisely determined, on the
whole, there might be expected some increased demand for capital
if people were confident that devaluation at this point would
mean no furtner depreciation of the currency. Such elimination
of fear about the currency would be a major advantage to be de-
rived from devaluation.
The present is not the time for definitive revaluation of
the dollar . Tne more serious inflationary measures imminent,
unless officials are convinced tnat tney will accomplish
notning in causing a permanent rise in prices or a recovery
in trade, are distinctly to be avoided, positive inflation
,
in other words, in a period of depression when tnere is
an abundance of credit availaole is undermining to the
confidence of tne people . Probably a rise of prices of
tangible properties ana equities would result ratner than an
increase in the demand for capital and labor for additional
f
c ons true t i c n . There__see: is .to be no reaS'/n rule ground for the
b elief that inflationary measures will afford the slightest
probability of the establishment of a higher re sonably per
-
manent pr ice lave l or that a full employment of labor with
r is.inK living s tandards will resul t.
In its enthusiasm f r increasing consumer purchasing power,
the Government displays a too tolerant attitude toward in-
creasing costs and prices. It has permitted general increases
in costs at the same time professing a desire for increase in
volume. It should have done mere tc check increases when lower
prices c< uld be reasonably expected t< encourage a greatly in-
creased denand • Dispari ty in prices has been especially detri -
mental to the rise of gene ral price level . A rise in the prices
of agricultural and mineral products somewhat moderated the
disparity between their food products and manufactured products
during last spring and summer, but later the tendency was re-
versed, a condition which constitutes the greatest single ob-
stacle to trade recovery. Faulty policies of the business
community and f the N. R. A. call for a changed point of view
and the adoption of price policies which will make conditions
favorable to a sustained producti< n and consumption of a larger
volume of goods and services. A greater encouragement of the
demand for materials and lab r required to meet deferred main-
tenance, replacement, and improvement of equipment creates
fc
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confidence, especially in the railroad business. The promise
of the government tc establish fair competitive c- nditicns
between railroads, trucks, and other agencies of transporta-
tion and an overhauling of the rate structure would be partic-
ularly stimulating. Such boldness in enterprise may well be applied
to industry in general. "Trade recovery requires that business
policies be directed tov/ard the enlargement - f demand under the
stimulating influence of reductions in c^sts and in prices, with
resultant increase in volume, but v/ithcut any general reducti n
in wages** A further Bound business policy tc be encouraged
is the lowering of interest rates and, in some instances, a re-
duction of the principal of debts as a stimulaticn to business
and industrial enterprise.
The deve lopment f a long-tine monetary system under which
the vc lume - f credit will increa se with the growth in the vol-
um_e _p_f_ trade, but not so rapidly in p r iods of activity as tc
induce unhealthy advances in pr ic es
;
r oth er pernicious develop-
tnentg and which will function in a manner to check wi de depart-
ures from ec',n. raic quilibrium between the var ious trading coun-
tries^ c a lis for the development f an impro ve d international
go ld standard. So accomplish this objective, however, it will
be necessary to strive to overcome former defects in the opera-
tion f the gold standard by specific and definite modifications
1. 0. M. W. Sprague
,
"Recovery and Common dense", p. 83
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of statutory limitations and better banking practices. A de-
cline in gold production ever a leng period could be met by a
very gradual reduction in statutory reserve requirements of
the Federal Reserve 3anks and of central banks in other coun-
tries. Some part of the reserves of the central banks might
be silver. Hew far this practice may be allowed to gc will
have to be determined by experiment. Ten per cent v/ill be a
wise limit to begin with probably after international agree-
ment steadies the price, ./hen increasing the use f silver
:' n
_
central banks provi sions should, be p&'de t < establish a
stable value cf silver not far above it s value at the time
the arrangements were put into effect . Tc counteract the
influence of the probable increase in hoarding -"hen the Unite*
States returns t< the gold standard, it is essential that an
agreement be reached between he principal c untries of the
world that their central banks shall only make deliveries cf
gold between themselves, and that arrangements be made for
the exclusive purchase of new gold from the mines by the var-
ious central banks, they in turn furnishing such amounts of
gold as may be required for industrial uses."-'- An interna-
tional gold standard with modification as suggested will not
either of itself r by mechanical functioning result in com-
plete stability; it dees, however, narrow the field in which
1. . It« Sprague, "Recovery and Common Sense", p. 91
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intelligent management must be exercised. N o monetary system
c an function independent ly of thg currency systems o f countries
beyond its border s. Further, if we take the imp'rtant step
,
we must assur e -urselves that the other countrie s return to
gel - als < at equilibrium rates; otherwise , the United States
w ill face the same problem of adjustment that baffle d hor dur -
i ng- the ten year s previous. A period of trial and err- r should
be entered by countries now on a paper basis be .ore stabilization
is attempted. After two or three years, if exchan e rate s can
b e maintained without great difficulty and if international pay-
men ts seem to be r ease nably balanced legal currency valuation
may be attempted, but it must be recogniz ed that practical s tab -
ilization must pr ec ede statutory stab ilization . For the United
States such a policy means abandonment of the policy of mani-
pulating the exchange rates and the maintenance of sufficient
control to eliminate extreme temporary fluctuations.
((
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DR. TUCKER'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS NO STATISTIC L
#) BASIS FOR THE COMMODITY DOLLAR
f!
Dr. Tucker believes there is no statistical basis for
the commodity dollar. He is in agreement with man# other
economists that the general crice level is not identical
with the average of the wholesale price level, even less
with any single index of wholesale prices. He cells the
Warren#Pe arson Index merely an arithmetical average: though
based on a much larger number of commodities than some others,
it is so weighted before 1840 as to be practically an index
of thirty raw materials and food stuffs. It does not re-
flect general conditions or monetary conditions as much as
it does agricultural conditions because almost everytime it
differs from other indexes in a =£iven year, a croo shortage
or a surplus occurred. The trend of the index between 1799
and 1840 deoends entirely on the arbitrary shifting of weight
by the compilers. Yet Warren and Pearson claim that the in-
dex correctly reoresents the wholesale price trend in the
United States and also furnishes an accurate measure of the
cost of living and the purchasing power of money.
Wholesale orices do not measure prosperity. Even an
accurate index would not be more than an arithmetical ab-
straction. An ^'ndex of the general price level is the only
kind of index that can measure the adea.uacy of the monetary
medium, though it may be impossible to ascertain. An
index of the v/holesale price level has little significance.

in the measurement of prosperity except as it enters into
the general price level. Wholesale prices are a measure
only of the prosperity of the entrepreneurs; rising prices
while benefitting them may injure the consumer. Dr. Tucker
contends that the individual commodity may differ much more
in its movements than the groups shown in Warren's diagram
of the period 1910-1914. It is the price of the individual
commodity that determines the profits of the producer.
The true measure of purchasing power is the relation of
the price received for a specific product to prices of the
commodities that one buys. Dr. Tucker maintains that the
indexes of farmers' purchasing power are utterly worthless.
The sixty - cent dollar and the hundred-and-fifty-cent
dollar in the Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale price
index, he further contends, is utterly misleading since it
aoes not measure purchasing power of dollars received by
wage-earners or bondholders, or any kind of citizen. Most
advocates of managed currency assume with no real evidence
that the trend of retail and of wholesale prices is the
same although it is admitted that the cyclical movements
in retail prices is much less extreme. Through personal
research, Dr. Tucker found that over a ninety- three-year
period in England and an eighty-three-year period in United
States indexes of the cost of living constructed directly
i(
(
(
from retail prices correspond very closely with indexes con-
structed by simply averaging wholesale prices with wages.
To him this type of index seems more accurate than an index
of wholesale prices.
Dr. Carl Snyder averaged several existing indexes of
wholesale prices and gave them a weight of thirty points,
etc., to wnich Dr. Tucker maae additions. The period 1791-
1932 revealed an uptrend of 0.5 per cent per year while bar-
ren and Pearson's index of wholesale prices, showed only 0.1
per cent per year ana the Jevons-Sauerbeck index for England
showed a down-trend of 0.2 per cent.
Dr. Tucker further maintains there is little connection
between the gold supply and the general price level. "War-
ren deduced from the wholesale price index the coaclusion
that tne annual gold production must equal 5.6 per cent of
the monetary gold stocks. From 1791 to 1932 the United
States was on the gold or bimetallic standard one hundred
twenty- two years. During ninety- two years the gold produced
was less than 5.6 per cent and in forty-five out of ninety-
two years prices actually rose. Warren worked out a relation-
ship between gold produced, the production of basic commodi-
ties and prices which even according to his own tables failed
to work thirty- two out of fifty- turee years, 1879-1932. By
including years when the United States was not on the gold
standard and the years for which no figures are available
<(
(
for physical production except his own arbitrary extrapo-
lations and by reducing his figures to a common denomina-
tor- the average of 1880-1914 and drawing them on a small
scale-by these herculean methods he succeeded in creat-
ing the impression that there was some connection between
the production of gold and the price level in the United
States between 1885 and 1915. By similar means he pur-
ported to show a relationship between world gold stocks
and prices in England from 1839 to 1915— admitting that
there was none from 1916 to 1931. But since his figures
of physical production before 1865 are merely backward
extensions of an estimated trend, there is only the per-
iod 1865-1915 to test this theory, and his own figures
show that in twenty-five of these fifty years the theory
was contradicted by the actual movement of the price aver-
age. 1 ' 1 So Dr. Tucker considers Dr. Warren's gold theory
unprovea.
He does not believe there is any consistent relation-
ship between gold and prosperity. Probably the relation of
the gold supply to prosperity is more important than the re
lation of the gold supply to the price level. An index of
American industrial activity constructed by Col. Ayres
1. Tucker, Rufus. "Gold, Prices, and Prosperity",
"The Annalist", (Dec. 1, 1933), p. 708.
•
reveals a trend above normal in forty-nine, or fifty-three
per cent, of the years of gold shortage and in twenty, or
sixty per cent, of the years of gold abundance. This index
includes prices as one factor, consequently weighting toward
the theory that rising prices are synonymous with prosperity.
A more important criterion, he states, would be the reel
wages of the working class which advanced most rapidly in
the decades when gold production is said to have been
sufficient and advanced more slowly or ceased to increase
in decades when gold production was considered sufficient.
Dr. Tucker points out that Warren end Pearson's own diagram
on page one hundred ninety-eight of "Prices" reveals this
fact, but that it seems to have escaped the authors. If
their index is sccurate it reveals that the long down-trends
of commodity prices for which the gold supply has been
blamed are fully exp'eined by the increased production of
commodities. They were only symptoms of America's rapid
increase in weslth end its wider distribution.
"There does not seem to be any statistical justification
for the belief that a rising trend of prices indicates
either the prosperity of the bulk of the population or n
increase in business activity. Long-time trends are con-
fused with cyclical fluctuations. Down-trends of prices
following the collapse of an over-extended credit situation
( *
C (
C (
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is, of course, destructive to profits and frequently to
employment, but it obviously has nothing to do with
changes in the gold supply or long-time trends of prices. "1
Major business crises have occurred in the United States
when the long-time trend of prices was up; for example, in
the years 1797, 1808, 1857, 1907, and 1914; when they were
down, as in 1859, 1884, and 1893; when the trend was up,
then down, as in 1819, 1873, 1920; and when the trend from
down up, as in 1896.
To prevent crises we should prevent or decrease over-
expansion of credit. But we cannot estimate the credit
expansion by the commodity Drice level, and the commodity
price level has little concern with the gold supply. Five
ye^rs of unusually steady wholesale commodity prices pre-
ceded the depression in which we find ourselves. Its major
cause lay in the fact that the central banks of the United
States and several other countries had deliberately attempted
to Drevent commodity orices from decreasing. This condition
had brought on or had proved an obstacle to the removal of
an imnense body of debt which finally collapsed of its own
weight
.
1. Tucker, R. L. "Gold, Prices, and prosperity"
,
"The Annalist" (Dec. 1, 1933) p. 708.
2. Ibid
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From the above line of argument he draws the conclusions
that:
1. A stable wholesale commodity price average is not so
significant as its exponents would have us believe.
2. The development of the modern banking system has de-
creased tne influence of the quantity of gold on the general
price level, either immediate or long-run. If there has been
any effect it has not been manifest in periods uhuer five
years, often longer.
3. History does not reveal any instance of a healthy
rise in prices resulting from an artificial "easing of cred-
it." "There is no reason to oelieve that the price level
can be raised by manipulating the gold supply and that attempts
to raise tne price level oy manipulating the credit supply will
either fail or lead to worse disaster."^- The most responsive
prices to "easy money" are those of the speculative commodities
and securities, but they do not always respond satisfactorily.
'. hen depreciation of the currency in the foreign exchange
markets results, the prices of imported goods rise first as
has been proved by recent experiences in England, Sweden,
ariu our own country. The most important prices
1. Tucker, R, L. "Gold, Prices, and Prosperity"
"The annalist", (Dec. 1, 1933)

in terms of social .'.elfare rise lest: wsges of laborers
and salaries of white collar workers. The greenback era
in our own country and the post-war inflation periods in
Europe are indisputable evidence. This sort of inflation
is ruinous to both the small capitalist and the thrifty
middle class; to both the skilled and unskilled laborers
it is cruel in its oppressive results.
(c
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DR. WHELDEN'S ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMODITY
DOLLAR AND IN REFUTATION OF DR. TUCKER'S
POINT of view
C \
J
Dr. C. H. Whelden, JF»| of Yale, seems to make the most
aole defense of the statistical oasis of x,ne commodity dollar.
He admits that the index numoer is an arithmetical average
of a few coimnoaities and tnat trie fluctuations are extreme,
out he contends that with proper weighting the unreliaoility
of such an index can be removed to a great extent, ".hen it
is remembered that until much later than 1840 the united jtates
was mainly an agricultural country, the point that index is an
average mainly of farm products ceases to oe any criticism at
all. Iiiven a poorly constructed index will frequently conform
in its Oroau movements witn an index of superior mathematical
form to a remarkable degree, in any discussion of tne commo-
dity dollar, or an index numoer dollar, the oroaa movements
are the particularly important ones.
it is true tnau even a perfectly accurate in^ex will not
oe a complete measure, out general changes in prosperity can
ue sufficiently indicated in terms of tne proper interpreta-
tion of almost any inaex of prices. It has been known for
fifteen years tnat tne variations of wholesale prices do re-
flect tne ^eneral movements in ousi.'iess activity. Investiga-
tions oy professor ..esley C« ..itchell and Professor i-'red C.
Kills have revealed that oroad movements in an index of par-
ticular prices ao reflect sufficiently the broau movements in
other prices because of xne high order of interconnectional
C !
relationship within the price system.
it is aosolutely misleading to maintain that an index of
wholesale prices would, be merely a mathematical abstraction
unlike the cost of living. The latter is merely an aostrac-
tion while the course of wnolesale prices is a concrete ana
vital thing to millions of human beings. Lvery index numoer
is an average, a realistic and representative aostraction,
in tne aegree to which it is taken from a homogeneous set
of facts and in this only proper sense the general price
level comes closest to being simply a mathematical aostrac-
tion.
It is not necessarily true that wnile wnolesale prices
are not a measure of prosperity because rising prices may
oenefit tne entrepreneurs they injure consumers, ana it is
selaom completely crue . ,..ost consumers are also proaucers
uepen<aent for their prosperity upon tne prosperity of the
entrepreneurs. xhe comiaana over tne means of satisfying
their wants possesseu. oy consumers is closely connected with
conditions of economic activity; conditions of general ac-
tivity have been well reflected by changes in the level of
wholesale prices, moreover, general standaras of living
have been almost universally higher when wholesale prices
in tne process of a lon^ rise than when they were exper-
iencing a long decline.

In refutation of Dr. Tucker's remarks on the one -hun-
dred- fifty-cent dollar, he says the index of general prices
uoes not measure the purchasing power of the dollar received
oy any particular kind of citizen principally because of the
inclusion in the index o_' the prices of securities. The
jureau of Laoor statistics does not have tne peculiar qual-
ity of measuring specifically the purchasing power of the
dollars spent by business men on the average in securing
their materials, supplies, equipment, anu stock in trade.
..ny truly realistic index of the cost of living must re-
late specifically to a part of the population; most are re-
lated to the case of industrial wa^e-earners . A measure of
the cost of living is of significance only in relation to
conditions of income. Fen people have a narrowly fixed in-
come over any £>articular period, and hardly any one has such
an income in periods of rapid and severe changes in price
levels. The variations in income tend to be more closely
related on the average to changes in trie level of wholesale
prices oecause of the connection of the latter with the
variations in ousiness activity tnan to changes in the cost
of livin^.
It is Dr. Y/helaen's contention that the instability of
the price level has oeen sufficiently great to destroy any
(
legitimate grounds for a charge that the wholesale price
level has given misleading exaggerations of instability of
the unit of value. There is ^rounus for the accusation of
social injustice ana social maladjustment is the use of
either measure. Dr. Warren's measure will prooably accom-
plish some staoilization in that part or tne price system
which has fluctuated most wiaely.
Dr. V/helden oelieves that 1 r. Tucker shoula improve
his chart of the world monetary stock of go la, the annual
production of gola, ana the ratio of the latter to the for-
i
mer for tne period lbOO-lyii^ by supplementing it with a
chart to the same ^raphic scale of an inaex of prices for
comparison. .. ith, tnis aauition the chart aoes not snow
connection between supply of ^old ana price level, x^e
would then see the relation working through the associated
factors of the supply-demana conditions of gola ana the
supply-demand conditions of other commodities, a relation
between tne proauction of gola ana the price level. The
general rise of prices simply roisters a fall in the value
of gold in the technical form of higher costs of production
for sale yat a fixed price, with a consequent tendency to
check its proauction,; with this reauced production tending
"go contribute ultimately to a recovery in the value of gola
ana a stimulus to its increasea production, with converse

effects for a general fall of prices. The process ooes not
occur directly or promptly enough to hold the fluctuations of
the value of gold ana of e,old standard prices within suffi-
ciently narrow limits in the course of a generation. This
relation aescrioea between golo production and gold standard
prices is not a relation between golo supply ana price level.
"jr. Vheldon oojects most particularly to . r. Tucker's
contention that the taDle failed to work thirty-two years
out of the total numoer charted, etc. me relationship is
intended to apply to uroad tendencies of prices on the gold
standard to rise or fall quite apart from cyclical or oxher
temporary movements over periods from twenty-five to thirty
years. ,r. " arren, he insists, has shown convincingly that
there is a clo^e relationship on oroad movements oetween
changes in the level of wholesale prices anu the ratio of
monetary stocks to the physical volume of prouuetion of
Oiisic cominouities , the price level rising in trend when
O olo stocks grow larger in relation to production.^ re-
lationship rests on the trend of prices with the trend of
the gold to the production ratio.
iwo prominent authorities in tne field, rrofessor ±norp
1. C. H. Y/heloen, Jr., "Gold, Prices, and prosperity:
A Reply to ,r. Tucker", "Tne Annalist" , (Dec. 2iJ,
1933)
,
p. 836
d. . C. H. 7/nelden, "Gold, Prices, and prosperity",
"The Annalist", (Dec. 29, 1933), p. 836

and Professor Litchell, agree that in periods of falling
prices the periods or depression are slightly longer in
relation to times of prosperity than in periods of rising
prices. The former's qualitative analysis and the latter'
s
measurements on five statistical indexes Dear witness to
that effect.
The following criticisms of ...rs. "..arren and Pearson's
index he considers respectively of no concern, without
bearing, and nothing to uo with the question in hand; that
according to real v.ages there has been relatively more pros-
perity wnen prices actually rising ; the matter of expansion
of population in tne country; tne discussion of other major
crises
.
Dr. Tucker's assertion that the desirability of the whole
sale commodity price has been ^reatly exaggerated^ in no way
follows from nis discussion and entirely misses the point.
And he has not proved that there is no reason to believe
tne price level can oe raised by manipulation. His claims,
with respect to conditions, since tne modern system of oank-
ing has oeen effective, especially his first point, is un-
true in relation to Droad movements of prices, nis second
point referring to the time span is largely immaterial ex-
cept as it emphasizes the unaesiraole instability natural
to a ^olo standard monetary unit.
!
In conclusion, Dr. '.Vhelden states that to return to the
old-fashioned gold-standard is to neglect the lessons of
experience and oave the way for a repetition of those social
injustices for which the gold standard was to blame in the
pas t
.

PROFESSOR REED'S IDEAS ON CURRENT MONETARY THEORIES
AND POLICIES
1<
6(( Professor Harold L. Reed, in discussing the probable action of
the commodity dollar during periods when a rise of agricultural
prices does not occur simultaneously with the rise of other
orices, reminds us that Dr. Fisher at the 1911 meeting of the
American Economic Association "would not recommend his (commodity
dollar) plan except on the condition that an international
agreement be drawn up whereby the imDortant governments of the
world would revise the gold values of their respective cur-
rencies simultaneously and in the seme degree. ""^ He goes on
to say that by this means an index number of international
prices would be drawn up, so that when the index rose, the gold
content of the pound, franc, lira, mark, and dollar would all
be increased; and vice versa. In that case, the dollar would
not depreciate in terms of foreign currencies and export
prices would not be unfavorably affected by raising the gold
content of the dollar. Since the London monetary conference
in 1933 possibilities of securing an international agreement
for periodic currency revaluations are more removed than ever.
But if revisions of gold values of different currencies could
be put into effect, the commodity dollar would be divested of
the only influence upon orices that can be expected to operate
1. Harold L. Reed, "The Commodity Dollar",
"Farrar h Rinehart Pamohlets, No. 2,"d. 15.
2. Ibid. See also Leo posvolsky, "Current Monetary Issues"
pp. 76,87.
I
promptly and decisively. Simply to change the gold base for
bank credit might produce no influence for the time being.
"Without ability to affect the foreign exchanges there would
be little predictable ootency in the commodity' dollar device.""''
Moreover such an international agreement would lessen rather
than increase the power of varying the dollar to control orices.
Professor M. T. Copeland's investigation of the effects of
a/
the 1933 devaluation programme in "Internotion Raw Commodity
2
Prices" supports this last conclusion." During this period
our currency devaluation affected exchange rates tremendously,
and the program was operating under esoecially favorable cir-
cumstances. His study reveals that many other "miscellaneous
factors were also affecting orices even of the important
articles of foreign commerce so that their resoonse to debase-
ment measures was by no means so uniform as had been predicted.
If such were the results in a neriod when efforts to lift
prices were getting the benefit of a dollar depreciated in the
foreign exchanges, it can only be concluded that efforts to
deoress prices by raising the gold content of the dollar might
be devoid of efficacy were foreign exchange processes made in-
,.3
operative .
"
1. Harold L. Reed, "The Commodity Dollar" "Farrar & Rinehart
Pamphlets, No
.
2", p. 16. See also Leo Pasvolsky, "Current Mone-
tary Issues", pn. 76,87.
2. Harold L. Reed, "The Commodity Dollar"
"Farrar & Rinehart Pamphlets, No . 2", p. 16.
3. Ibid. p. 17.

Returning to ^r. Reed's consiaeration of the new aollar
device as a means of increasing the supply of gola, we find
he believes advocates of this expedient argue from a complete
misconception of the gold standard. He points out that the
Fordney-McCumber tariff was a significant factor in promoting
gold "nervousness" abroad. Other trends unfavorable to the
proper functioning of the gola standard he finds in the unfor-
tunate episode of tne French acquisition of i.amense supplies
of gold after 1927. ohe lacked institutional facilities and
willingness to lena to foreign enterprises. Except to insure
domestic confidence in her paper money, gola was of little
service to her. Particularly unfortunate for worla prosperi-
ty v;as the fact tnat the United States attempted to benefit
her exporters by increasing the value of gold; in consequence,
she came to possess the highest per capita circulation of gold
of any country in the world, out she also lacked the facilities
of London for financing international commerce. The post-war
policy of Englana was to fix too low a sterling price for gold
until 1931. Ke agrees with the widely-neld opinion of mone-
tary experts that the return of the British pound to tne old
par was the .uost disastrous event in tne entire financial
nistory of the world. The American 1933 policy in increasing
the dollar value of gold wnen she already held more than
forty per cent of the world's gold supply, operated in such a

way as to draw gold from countries much weaker in gold and
created very disturbing consequencies . Never before had the
gold standard sustained such an attack. Countries which could
use gold most effectively lost it, while those which gained it,
either could not or would not use it oroperly. Man, not gold,
then, was responsible for these disturbances; no international
monetary system could function oroperly under these conditions.
The remedy lies in establishing gold values of different
countries at levels that corresDond with their goods' values,
not in artificially increasing the money value of gold in gold-
strong countries in order to offset accelerated demand. Then
it is an absurdity to determine by proclamation the value of a
country's money, and the gold standard should be abandoned
where it is attempted. It is oointless to adopt an inter-
national monetary system in w ich gold movements depend on
official decrees instead of upon trade and financial balances.
From rrofessor Reed's point of view, then, gold is a
balancing item and not the initial source of purchasing pov/er.
it
But even as a balancing power it is not so important as pre-
vi usly was, its chief significance being a means whereby
nations settle accounts with one another that are somewhat
out of balance. ,J-'he amount of t-is metal that will be required
to balance accounts will deoend much more upon financial and
trade policies than upon the physical volume of trade. It is
i(J
his theory that a notion loses gold if too much credit has
been extended to those who cannot sell abroad. Such loss of
gold is the signal to take measures to prevent so much credit
from being extended to those who buy abroad. Efforts of this
nature will do away with the situation in which debts will
not be cancelled by credits; if they are prompt and vigorous
enough only small amounts of gold will have to be shipoed
abroad to settle balances. If, however, nations losing gold
do not heed those signals but continue to allow credits to
those who cannot sell abroad, the gold standard is not func-
tioning normally. If instead of placing reliance on banking
action it is placed on import restrictions and on currency
devaluation, unbalanced trade will remain in that state.
Of course other nations will feel free to adopt the same
devices. A worse hazard will be the erection by other
countries of high tariffs and import restrictions. In this
situation after trade has been throttled, the gold standard
is often believed to be the cause. But gold is not to blame
when trade and investment are unbalanced; it has performed
its task when it hea given warning that inward and outward
payments are out of balance. To say that nations should be
"supplied with more gold in such a situation is merely to
contend that trade that cannot clear should be financed."^"
1. Harold L. Reed, "The Commodity Dollar",
"Farrar & Rinehart Pamplets, No. 2", p. 39.
)
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If gold is to be considered purchasing power v;e shall never
have enough of it if policies are adopted which destroy clear-
ance. There is far more gold in the world than is required to
"balance accounts if wiser financial and trade policies are
reestablished. The basic causes of unbalanced trade must be
overcome if prosperity is to be restored. And the gold
standard will be merely a device to e xtend the orthodox
principles of banking to the broader sphere of international
trade
•
]
121
THE IDEAS OF BASSETT JONES ON THE RELIABILITY AND
VALIDITY OF THE INDEX NUMBER
•
'I
The ideas of Bassett Jones on the Reliability
and Validity of the Index Number
The liberally-inclined mathematical statistician, Bassett
Jones, attacks the conception of index numbers and price
levels as possessing little or no scientific validity.^ He
contends that there is much confusion regarding the actual
meaning of the wholesale price index originally prepared by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and extended and modified by
barren and Pearson. He states that attempts to correlate
their index series frith statistical series have led to what
seem meaningless results. He comes to the conclusion as a
result of his studies of the index of wholesale price series
that the indexes were not of wholesale prices but of some thin
else. Time correlations found between these indexes and
other series of relatives lend to contradictions and con-
fusion in the attempt at interpretation into economic mean-
ings. But suppose we let the statistician explain his point
1. Bassett Jones, "Horses and Apples"
See also Warren and Pearson, "Prices", Chapter V
• 1
# '
of view in his own language.
"Warren and Pearson have actually stated that within
the obvious approximations introduced in setting up both
index series, gold stocks must equal the square of the total
cost of production multiplied by some constant. Double the
total cost of production and gold stocks quadruple.
"The fallacy of Warren and Pearson's whole discussion of
prices lies in the fact that neither they, nor so far as the
writer knows, anyone else, has actually determined an average
price level, or the actual relation of such a price level to
anyother factors in the system. The discu s sion is based on
something that does not exi3t .
"The assumption that prices in any given market are
primarily a matter of the relative quantity of goods offered
in that market is decidedly questionable . -- In all probability
prices in any market are affected quite as much, if not more
,
by the prices in other markets. If the quantity theory of
money be even reasonably correct, and the 'law' of supoly
and demand has any generality and bearing on the matter,
this is an obvi us conclusion. Then the relative importance
of any market in determining prices ee a whole would be
proportional to the number of dollars gvaiia'nle in all
markets including services and securities, '"ere this correct
1. Bassett Jones, "Horses and Apples", p. 97.
(
then since the number of dollsrs involved in the wholesale
comm od ity market is but a fract i on of the wh ole, the im -
portance of the prices in this market relative to general
prices is of comparative insignificance. Again, probably the
purchasing power of the dollar varies among the different
merkets, in which case an entirely different factor is intro-
duced into the problem of setting up price standards. Then a
new element in weighting the statistics is required. The
prices in different markets can be combined into a general
price level only when weighted accordingly. But this introduces
another problem. How shall the correct weighting factors
dependent on the purchasing power of the dollar be determined,
and how shall these be combined on a common basis of measure
into a general purchasing power?"
"The exchange measure of commodities, or what is called
the purchasing power of the commodities, 'is usually cal-
culated by dividing the index number of prices by the average
prices of all commodities at wholesale '.^ The purchasing power
of wages in dollars is found by dividing the index number of
wages by the index number of prices. ^"^
1. Bassett Jones, "Horses and Apples", pp. 96,99.
2. "Prices", Warren and r earson, p. 72.
3. Ibid., p. 196.
4. Bassett Jones, op. cit., p. 100.

"Now since the so-called inr.ex number of prices is actually
an index number of total dollars, the process of dividing
this index into any other index (assuming both indexes are
properly related on a common measure basis so the result is
not like dividing horses by apples or, for that matter even
.
horses by horses) gives an index of so much of the quantity
reoresented by such other index per dollar. This is de-
termining as above the index of purchasing power of commodities
on the assumption that the average price is an average price
and not something else, what has actually resulted is an in -
dex of average price oer dollar involved in the wholesale
commodity market -whatever that means. In determing the pur-
chasing power of wages as above described, the result is an
index of dollars paid in wages per dollar involved in the
wholesale commodity market. Perhaps this can be taken to
mean the oer cent of each dollar involved in the commodity
market that is paid in wages. It may be concluded from this
that the per cent of commodities marketed, at the aver age
price then prevailing, that the wages paid can buy, is re-
oresented by this percentage. But in this statement the
expression at the average price then prevai l ing must be in-
cluded since the average price does not occur in the index
of total dollars. Only if the average price at the time be
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known does the resultant index g i ve any idea ss to hew much
of the commodities a dollar of wages will buy which, after all,
is a very fundamental matter. Consequently it may be said that
this index of 'the purchasing power of wages' means little
if anything short of an accompanying index of average prices,
qua prices.
"Perhaps enough has been s^id to indicate that none of
these resultant indexes obtained by operating on the so-called
IVholesale Price Index means what they are claimed to mean. If
under such delusive circumstances any market procedure is
established, the result is practically certain to be different
from expectations, and these differences may well be quite
destructive in their reactions.
'^So - hen it is stated that prices have changed a given
amount up or down , what has actually been said is that the
number of dollars represented by the product of price times
Quantity of commoditie s has changed so much up or down. If
it be stated that the purchasing power of wa-es has changed
so much up or down whet has actually been said is that the
per cent of the total dollars obtained by multiplying price
times quantity of commodities that represents wages paid has
ch&nged so much up or down
.
Nothing has been said about the
purchasing power of the dollar-aa to whether the dollar will
buy more or less of any commodity as a result of these changes .

12*
" Any sttemut to increase 'prices' on this basis merely
represents an attempt to increase prices titr.es quantity of
commodities
.
Furthermore, and whatever it may be, the result has
no precise meaning unless all quantities involved in setting
up the indexes are related in terms of a common measure
having some meaning in the premises and are not as meaning-
less as putting together the products or sums of horses and
apples
.
."At the end of every inquiry the item of average prices
presents itself as an unknown quantity. It seems to be the
missing link which might relate together 8 number of matters
on seme understandable basis. Obviously price, qua price,
is the link between the amount of commodities and services,
and the dollars available for purchase.
"Evidently an average price is not only unknown, but
possibly also indeterminable. Perhaps we have been chasing
a will-o- 1 the-wisp, because the words 'average price' have
no more meaning than 'the average color of a painting' or
'the average sound of sn orchestra'. One might as well dis-
cuss the average velocity of all bodies in a dynamic system
leaving direction of motion out of the account. Is not price
but one of the factors in purchasing power , apart from which
it means nothing? Only when horses and apples can be added

together can we add the orice of horses to the orice of apples
and obtain a result that means anything both in the market for
horses and in the market for apples. However, we c&n add to-
gether the dollars required for all horses for sale and the
dollars required for - 11 apples for sale after which we can
discuss a much more important question, namely whether the
consumer of horses and apples has that many dollars to spend
and, what is more, even if he has the dollar, whether he wants
or can use, that many horses and that many apples at any
number of dollars per horse or per apple. Has any consumer
any hankering for the number of horses and apples at so many
dollars apiece that he bought in 1926?—Would it be possible
to cr-3Lite a^ein the wholesale market of 1926 as to numbers of
dollars, much less to set up a new market in which as a function
of time
,
the number of dollars spent will be 8S much larger
than those spent in 1P26 as the market of 1926 was larger in
total dollars say than the market of 1900? Yet, in effect
is not this exactly wh«:t our industrial authority proposes
shall be done? Whence, and by what route, is the necessary
purchasing power to come?""*"
1. Bessett Jones, "Horses and Apples", pp. 100-104.

PART VI
A Review of the Monetary Programme of Dr. Warren
and His School
and
Main Points of Attack upon it by Its Opponents
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The Age of Financial Hierarchy and Speculation, theiji, be-
tween 1911-1929, crashed in the bottomless fall of inflated
stock values, the cd lapse of badly managed banks, the effects
of misguided foreign policy in demanding debt payments in gold
instead of buying goods 5 unsouna foreign loans and the begin-
ning of downward rush of the process of aeflation, on a world
wide-basis. In extricating the country from the great debacle
the New Dealers attempted measures of a "planned society", con-
trolling even the purchasing power, the stability of prices, and
currency, naming their devices "an intelligence control and man-
maae shelter against the winds ana weathers of chance and disor-
ganization in economics ."
Dr. Warren and his supporters contend that there was specu-
lation in golu as an international medium of exchange among
Europeans in particular, speculation in currencies as Americans
knov; speculation in stocks. The interest of these international
oankers in the gold standard ana a stable rate of exchange arises
mainly from their connection with banking commissions and in
international capital movements, whereas internal financial
soundness is more vital to tne masses of the people than rates
of exchange. He insists that the .jnerican gold dollar
1. J. George Frederick, "A Primer of 'New Deal' F.conom-
ics", p. 139.

has been far more useful and stabilizing to bankers and to
foreign nations than to the United States; so his plan has
reversed the method of expressing values in terms of gold
into the method of expressing the value of the dollar in
terms of commodity prices. The intention is to plan a
dollar that always represents a certein fixed relation to
commodity orices while fluctuations sre taken care of in the
Treasury Department at Washingtoo by the simple procedure of
lowering or raising the gold content of the dollar. Since
the Federal Reserve has raised and lowered interest rates
for years according to orices, why not raise the gold con-
tent of the dollar or the gold price with equal facility?
Both operations are considered equally simple.
This kind of "honest" dollar, the "managed" dollar^ we are
told, will tend to smoother business cycles and may do away
with panics. It is no longer tied up with the gold currencies
and exchanges of the world, but is actually a national rather
than 8n internaticnal coin. The plan, then, is to employ
the managed dollar based on commodity price indexes and kept
domestically stable but allowed to do what it will on foreign
exchanges, the theory being that domestic currencies should be
made strong before attempting foreign coordination. Thus a
dollar in wages, it is said, v/ill regularly be dependable in
•
terms of the standard of living and much of the disturbances
over wages, real wages, the cost of living, and prices will
become obsolete. The economic system will be steadied and
there should not be such shifts as occurred in the purchasing
power of the dollar in 1897, 1920, 1929, and May, 1933: low, 45
in 1920, high 149 in 1897, 73 in 1929, and 108, in May, 1933.
There is no intention of ceasing to base money on gold, out
the idea is to use it as collateral for dollars and not 8S a
medium of international exchange. Gold should be kept within
the nation as bullion to back the currency instead of being
sent in great shipments abroad "to protect" the dollar or to
shift balances. The monetary dictator says that when the
American domestic purchasing pov/er is stabilized with its
currency^ international exchange rates will take care of them-
selves. Foreign nations seek stability of their currencies
and since theirs h-ve been so generally valued in terms of
American dollars they are anxious to have the American dollar
fixed as soon ss possible in gold. This the monetary dictators
cannot do without deserting their entire programme for a
managed currency since the gold content of the new managed
or "laboratory" dollar probably will not become "fixed" for
several years; that is^ntil commodity prices in some measure
may be considered stabilized.
•
From the point of view of Dr. V/arren and his school, the
many grave defects of the gold standard have caused a peace-
time breaking dov/n and it is not automatic in operation. It
fails to level prices and its flow does not vary according to
changing price levels, but some times does the opposite. "Large
quantities of gola stock have not tenaed to increase prices--
nor have they safeguarded inflation of commodity prices or cap-
ital values, not corrected adverse balances of trade, nor is
gold the decisive factor in the volume of monetary supply.
Finally it nas fluctuated as much as commodity prices: "1 dur-
ing the last thirty years, the stock of gold has fluctuated 8.2
per cent. He contends that psychologically speaking the United
States has been off trie gold standard ana on a "multiple econ-
omic product and service standard" 2 for decades during which
.-.mericans did not concern themselves about gold or ever saw
gola coins. America should not hesitate to go off the gold
standard following the example of England whose financial pol-
icy has always been conservative ana usually wise. It would
have been to her interest, however, if we had remained on.
These arguments, tnen, a.« for being off a "fixed" gold stan-
dard and ao not mean that there will not be "a more or less
fixed golu stabilization, ' though not yet and not unless and
until commodity prices also reach a stable level.
1. J. George Frederick, "A Primer of 'New Deal' Economics, 11
p. 145.
2 . Ibid.
,
3. Ibid., p. 146
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Major Doints of attack upon Dr. '"arren's monetary doctrines
are s his adherence to the Quantity Theory of Honey, the valid-
ity and reliability of his wholesale orice index, his programme
of devaluation and the commodity dollar, in the attempt to raise
purchasing power possibilities of uncontrolled inflation con-
tingent upon them, and the theory that the United States can adopt
economic nationalism in currency management disregarding inter-
national exchange.
Cassel's theory, amplified and modified by Dr. Warren, that gold
oroduction must average three ner cent of gold stocks to orevent
commodity >rices from falling, on the assumption that the orice level
of 1910 was the same as 1850, is daclared v/orthless. At least
three important defects are pointed out in the Warren thesis that
the decline in prices during a depression is caused by a shortage
in the world supply of gold relative to the demand for it «nd that
the remedy lies in reversing the nrocess pnd restoring of the pre-
depression orice level by raising the rice of gold enough to
overcome the shortabe. ^irst, it is based on ore-war rates of
growth of gold stocks in relation to oroduction of commodities
and does not give sufficient consideration to the changes in
industry and monetary technique in that period or the- economics
introduced in the use of gold through central banking and other
devices since 1919. Secondly, it does not take into account, the
more significant overexpansion of credit ^nd credit abuses. In
Warren 1 1 theory credit is reduced to a minor role while he
i
emphasizes stability in the rate of growth of the production and
the variability in the monetary demand for and supply of gold.
Thirdly, it does not recognize the greater significance of the
maldistribution of gold in causing stringencv and world breakdown
due to war debts, reckless private lending, tariffs, and the delay
of some centrrl banks in checking credit expansion.
^
In conflict with the theories which emphasize money, credit,
and velocity of money incomes and the unspent margin as the
dominating factors on the money side of the eauation of exchange,
Dr. Warren emphasizes stability in the rate of growth of the pro-
duction and variability in the monetary demand for the supply of
gold. To or: ng these conflicting theories in harmony, Dr. Warren
and hia gold theorists have to prove that money and credit times
2
velocity change proportionally with the gold supply.
T^at a managed currency is futile is a point stoutly maintained
by several economists. Experiments of the silver bloc in the
United States between 1930 and 1933 are cited showing that they
have not worked out as intended. The?,- further maintain that the
gold exchange and gold bullion standards in force between
1923 and 1029 were responsible for the financial
1. S. L. Wetkins, Discussion of Dr. barren's Speech at
American Economic Association Meeting. Supplementary
Papers and Proceedings. Vol. 24, (March, 1934^, o. 132.
2. Ibid, o. 133.
t
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crash to a great extent. Not only is this theory of inflation
by devaluation based on the theory of money control futile", it
is obsolete. Professor Fisher sponsored it before the estab-
lishment of the Federal Reserve .jank system. It was intended
by changing the gold content of the dollar by small amounts
"to increase or decrease bank reserves, the volume of credit
and prices. It was intended to permit credit expansion when
prices started down and to restrain it when they started up
with the hope that this would stabilize the price level, ^fter
the Federal Reserve system was established, bank reserves were
rnaue more elastic by rediscount and open market operations, and
this type of control advocated by Fisher was made unnecessary.
Until December he seemed to have given up the plan and had urged
instead that tne discount policy of zhe Federal deserve System
oe usea to regulate member bank reserves in oraer to control the
expansion or contraction of credit." * Economists of this school
contend that it is a fatal defect in this type of price control
that it assMes the existence of a constant demand for credits
and they emphasize that new gold reserves affect prices only if
and when they result in ruw loans which increase the ^emand for
goods* In the light of the history of inflation, it has been de-
termined tnat when active demand ceased and prices cease to rise
}
"cney do not staoilize but oegin to recede. Jo far as there is
1. '..alter A. Norton, "The Lffect of Devaluation on Dank
credit, trices, and business activity",
"The annalist," Vol. 42, (Dec. 8, 1933;, p. 739.

any rational basis for manipulation, it rests on the ground that
there exists a pressure demand for credit and that the existing
business structure is in perfect static equilibrium ready to
resnond by absorbing new funds. 1 Business and price structure,
however, are not balanced; so devaluation merely delays the period
of basic readjustment which must be attained through the Durooseful
activity of business and financial and political leadership.
Furthermore, the orice raising acts of the N.R.A. and the A. A. A.
are mutually exclusive'. The .A. A. A. adopted the programme of
raising prices for farm products, but the N.R.A. pursued a policy
of higher prices for manufactured goods which the farmers must
consume, part of the rise in orices oaid by farmers reflects the
advance in farm orices themselves, but the greater oart is simoly
significant of the success of the N.R.A. in neutralizing to a
marked degree the progress of the A. A. A.
A less immediate effect of devaluation attacked by opponents
of that oolicy is the possible precedent established for currency
manipulation by the government in favor of particular classes
under political oressure.
As to the international repercussions of an American managed
domestic currency, stress is laid uoon the point that exchange
1. F. C. Mills, "Price Aspects of the Monetary Problem 11 ,
"Proceedings of the academy of rolitical Science", Vol. 16,
(April, 1954), p. 8.
2. 'Vinthrop Case, "Price Parity Goal Retreats Steadily before
Price Raising Costs under N.R.A.", "The Annalist",
July 6, 1934, p. 9.
3. Ibid.
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rates are not determined by the gold content of currencies,
but by supuly and demand of bills of exchange. Over a
long oeriod, under a reasonable decree of freedom of trade, cur-
rency oayments are determined roughly by relative Drice levels
or by purchasing power parities. Under these conditions, exchange
rates and price levels tend to coincide. If, however, rates are
forced out of line with orices, either international or American,
prices must rise or the orice for money must eventually fall.
Thus exchange rates are a reflection of relative prices, not
of gold content . --Dr . Warren's assumotion is that exchange
rates will reflect the gold-content of various currencies.—Such
students of exchange operations contend tbat if our internal
prices do not double or our exchange rate halve, the tendency
will be for gold to move out of the gold standard countries
and that the United States will simply become a hoarder of
gold while gold standard countries will be forced off gold and the
gold content of world currencies will again become irregular. These
authorities state that to assume that American prices will rise re-
lative to other prices as fast as exchange rates fall is to neglect
the facts. Devaluation in the United States, they believe, will
probably force all countries off gold and exchange rates will be
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determined, in the long run, by the bslsnce of payments and rela-
tive orive level and in the short run by specie and capital move-
ments
.
Some economists go so far as to say that "the only practical
means of maintaining stable foreign exchanges is through the op-
eration of an international gold standard based upon fixed gold
ratios, unlimited redemption of naper currency in gold at a
fixed rate for nurposes of international payments and, in un-
limited market for gold at a fixed price, and free exports and
imports of the metal."'''— They point out that the determination
of the United States to develop economic nationalism r nd "to
raise domestic orices by independent monetary action makes it
impossible for the world as a whole to establish stable exchanges
and to the normal functioning of an international monetary sys-
tem,"^ It is further indicated that at the World Monetary and
Economic Conference meeting at Geneva in January, 1933, the dis-
cussion of experts led to the conclusion that internationally
there can be no probability of a satisfactory resumption of
1. Leo Pasvolsky, "Current Monetary Issues", o. 130
See also, J. H, Williams, "The World's Monetary Dilemma"
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science", Vol, 16,
(April, 1934) p. 65. See also in "Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science", Sir Arthur Salter, "Inter-
national Aspects of Recovery", p. 120
2. Ibid. (Pasvolsky) p. 131.
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credit relations until an international standard of value is resumed. 1
—
"Independent movements of national orice levels under the impetus
of unco-ordina ted domestic Drice-raising measures v/ould merely serve
to increase the already existing maladjustments in the world price
structure and thus retard rather than promote general economic re-
covery through a curtailment of international trade." It has been
their exoerience that when important commercial nations attempt to
control foreign trade through currency depreciation there inevitably
results a fall in gold prices: several countries which v/ere still
on the gold standard found themselves forced to meet the competition
of non-gold countries by reducing the prices of their exports. Re-
commendations of experts st the conclusion of the Conference comprised
!: the re-establishment of an international gold standard, free from
restraints of foreign exchange control, with very little admixture
of price management, and without any dilution of gold with silver. "3
As to the efficacy of the experiment in price regulation in the
light of the experience of six countries, Great Britain, Japan,
Sweden, France, Italy, and the United States, Dr. pasvolsky asserts
that "according to the theory in the case of France, the price level
should have become almost five times that of the United States,
then on ?n unchanged currency unit, and should
1. Ogden Mills, "Financial Policies of Recovery", "Proceedings
of the Academy of Political Science", Vol. 16, (April, 1934),
o. 103. See also "Proceedings of the academy of Political
Science", '7. A. Brown, Jr. "The ?ost-1,rar Gold Standard", p. 60.
Leo Pasvolsky, "Current Monetary Issues," p. 29.
3. Ibid, p. 30.
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have moved from 1^27-1932 in exact proportion with ..merican pri-
ces of five to one. Similarly the Italian lira has had a gold
content equal to slightly less than one-fourth of its pre-war
rate; hence, the Italian price level should have adjusted it-
self at about four times the American level."-'- Dr. Warren in
"Prices" on page 171 says that this occurred. "France reduced
the weight of gola in the franc so that ner prices are about
five times pre-war when prices in the United States are at pre-
war. Italy reduced tne weight of gola in the lira so that her
price level is nearly 400 when prices iri the United States are
luO." But "the data wnich they present on page 17 anu show
graphically on page 171 of their book ("Prices") uo not support
this assertion. While French and Italian prices have in fact
oeen much higher than ^merican prices^ the ratios have shown
neither uniformity nor mathematical precision. ..s shown by the
arren and Pearson diagram, the ratio Qetween the French and
American price levels varied, during the years 1927-32, from
4.2:1 to 4.4:1; the ratio between the Italian and ^merican price
levels fluctuated between 3.0:1 and 3.6:1."*
Concluding his survey of the experience of the six countries,
he says: "It is evident that whether the period of depreciation
of the currency unit has been only a few months as in the united
States, or a year anu a half as in Great Britain, Jweden, and
Japan, there is no close correspondence between changes in the
commodity price level. Even over a period of years following a
1. Leo Pasvolsky, "Current i.onetary Issues," p. Ii8.
2
« Ibid, p. 119.
(1
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definite devaluation of currency units, when any lagging tendency
would oe completely overcome, there is no mathematically precise
relationship between commodity prices ana the reauced content of
the currency unit.'" 1
The Wholesale Price Index Number^ as advocated by Warren
and Pearson is attacked on the ground that it is lacking in sci-
entific validity and reliability. First of all, there is con-
fusion as to the actual meaning of the Wholesale Price Index as
originally prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and extended
and modified by Warren and Pearson. Attempts to correlate their
index series with statistical series have led to results that are
meaningless, and some have come to the conclusion that the indexes
are not really of wholesale prices, but of something else. Further-
more, time correlations found between these indexes and other series
of relatives have led to contradictions and confusion when attempts
are made to interpret them in terms of economics.
A fallacy in their discussion is the fact neither they nor any
other economist has ever determined an average price level or the
relation of such a price level to any other factors in this system.
We are told that the discussion is based on something that does not
exist. And, as a matter of fact, only if an average price at a
giver: tin.e can be known does a resultant index give any idea as to
1. Leo Pasvolsky, "Current monetary Issues,* p. 119.
Q
how much of commodities a dollar of wages will buy. But average
price is unknown and indeterminable. It would seem that the re-
sultant indexes obtained by use of the Y/holesale Price Index do
not mean what they purport to mean. If market procedure is at-
tempted results will probably diverge from expectation, and may
become destructive in reaction.
1
After the selection the basic and outstanding commodities
assumed to represent all others, the process of computation in-
volves the weighting of each of the goods and services in the aver-
age in proportion to its human significance. Meanwhile some of the
items are becoming obsolete and other groups of prices of new
socially important goods will appear. After all the complicated
tech\nical process is completed, the result is an abstraction re-
lating to a mythical average citizen and not to actual needs and
activities of real human beings. It is important to remember that
experts do not agree among themselves as to the validity of their
determinations of the index number. In point of fact, several in-
dex numbers must be computed, each reflecting the changes in one
factor or group of factors.
Our survey of the subject has shown us that there is so: e
question concerning whether the average administrative government
official possesses the expert knowledge and requisite qualities
to undertake so complicated a task especially if the selfish interests
1. See Bassett Jones, "Horses and Apples".
p<
of individuals or of groups are able to bring political pressure
to bear on the making and revising of the tables. We have found
further criticism to the effect that the plan is politically im
practicable in view of the manifold, arduous duties of our mon-
etary dictators.
1. See Edgar L. Furnes:
,
"Reflections on the New Dollar."
"Yale Review," Vol. 23, March, 1934, p.p. 448-465.
o
Devaluation and comi ercial banking are declared mutually in-
consistent. Inflation by this method necessitates the acquisition
by bank systems of vast quantities of securities based on financial
assets, which is a condition contrary to recognized theories of
commercial banking and to legislative intention. This requires
inflation of bank rssets which is not in line with an administrative
programme which is based on the assumption of a return to regular
commercial banking. The logic back of this theory of devaluation
is that by lowering the external value of the dollar, prices of
exportable goods will rise and gradually all internal orices. In-
ternal orices will rise as exchange rates fall. If this rise in
prices can be induced through right psychological conditions, the
price level thus attained can be preserved without an increase in
credit or its velocity . -But specific rises in prices do not often
occur without an increase in credit and its velocity . -All economic
elements must be perfectly mobile to attain the coveted increase
in prices. It is not a foregone conclusion that the people of the
country and the banks will respond so satisfactorily to decreased
dollar content as to raise internal orices accordingly. The spread
of price rise is slow and uncertain, and there are too many
variables and uncertainties in the situation to predict measureable
success for the Dolicy. It is maintained that the fall in the gold
commodity since 1931 has not been an independent variable, as is
implied by Dr. Warren, but that it has been a function of exchange
depreciation in the ron-gold standard countries.
r
It is generally agreed that depression of exchange is more
beneficial to countries in which foreign trade is a more dominant
element than in the United States (ten oer cent in normal times)
and in which deorecistion is primarily due to pressure through
balance of oayments
. That gains so far attributable to deoreic^tion
of exchanges are much less than were predicted by Dr. ,,Tarren, is
noted by these observers.
7/ith resDect to orice behavior since the inauguration of Dr.
Warren's oolicies, critics contend that a rise in the general orice
level had already begun when the United States abandoned the gold
standard. There was reason to exoect such a change from the low
points of February, 1933 without such action. It is impossible to
determine to what extent these increases are attributable to the
gold policy itself since many other factors have contributed, such
as the threat of inflation. The Bureau of Labor Index of Wholesale
Prices ha a risen only seventeen to twenty per cent since the old
parity of the dollar was disturbed; only a small oer cent of that
amount since Octooer twenty-second when the policy of raising
general prices was out into operation. This index is biased by the
incl sion of international commodities. If the Warren theory is
workable, it would seem that further action by the government would
by unnecessary. In view of the fact that the gold price has been
raised nearly sixty-five oer cent, i t is logical to exoect a

comparable rise in average prices or a continuous movement toward
that average."^ If his gold theory is correct 'priming the dupio 1
should now have occurred, and it should not be necessary to reoeat
the orocess continuously and to invoke other cures." To select
fifteen to thirty basic commodities with a world market several of
which are subject to soeculative influence and depreciating exchanges,
including some belonging to the import category is not a proof of
validity. And it is no more convincing when the comparison is ex-
tended to a number of countries.
To the following criticisms Dr. Pearson raekes categorical
answer. ^ First, that in changing the orice of gold, certain com-
modities have risen more than the price of gold; others, almost
in proportion to the price of gold; many, only a little; others,
have made no change; while a few have declined. Secondlv, it has
depressed wages end salaries. Thirdly, it has developed into a
method of relieving debtors at the expense of creditors.
With respect to the seemingly erratic behavior of prices, he re-
peats that the price of gold is only one of five factors that affect
the .rice of a commodit:/- : supply of and demand for the commodity,
end supply of and demand for gold, constituting the other four.
1. Watkins, Discussion of Dr. Warren's Speech at American
Economic .Association. "Proceedings of Forty-Sixth Annual
Meeting", Vol. 24 (March, 1934), p. 154.
2. Ibid.
3. F. A. Pearson, "Money end Credit in the Recovery Program",
Proceedings of the Academv of Political Science", Vol. 16
(April, 1934), dp. 37-45.
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This advocate of the Quantitative Theory of Money points out that
a rise in the price of gold is already tending to establish equi-
librium in the orice structure. Those which had previously fallen
most rapidly have now made a sharD advanee, while those which had
previously declined only slightly do not have to decline.
As to the effect on wages and salaries, he maintains that during
the period of moderate deflation many peoDle continued to hold t'^eir
positions and to profit by conditions, but with the overwhelming
price collapse, a large proportion of the first group either were
reduced to the ranks of the unemployed or were forced to accent cuts
in wages and salaries. Relfation, he argues, will benefit these
groups by stimulating employment and doubling the number of dollars
at their command.
Dr. Pea rson denies that price changing ultimately results in
favoring the debtor at the exoense of the creditor. During the early
moderate deflationary period preceeding the depression many creditors
c ntinued to receive complete interest and capital payments and
orosoered at the expense of the debtor because the value of the
dollar was rising. With the increased severity of the deflation
this favorable condition vanished as more and more debtors ceased
to oay. Meanwhile securities broke down until even municipal bonds
defaulted, and the creditor became absorbed in saving his capital
rather then in the purchasing power of its income. The effect of
the rising price of gold on these classes is to oerrait the debtors
1
to meet a larger part of his fixed charges and to free the creditors
from the tremendous csnital losses they would have been forced to
endure under complete deflation. If creditors had been able to
carry on, that is, to collect, Drobably the gold standard would not
have been abandoned. The small loss in purchasing power of creditors
incomes is more than compensated by their rescue from great capital
losses a continuing deflation would have brought them. On the
contrary, then, the creditor class is not injured so much as bene-
fitted by the policy of raising the price of gold to re-establish
the equilibrium in the orice structure and thereby restore incomes
and profits. All clcsses v/ill benefit.
Gold theory economists maintain it h s been known for fifteen
years that the variations of wholesale orices do reflect the
general movements in business activity. The investigations of pro-
fessor Wesley C. Mitchell and of Professor Fred C. Mill* they credit
wjth proving t^is point. They maintain, therefore, a statistical
basis for the commodity dollar exists. It is admitted that the
index number is merely an arithmetical average of a few commodities
and that fluctuations are wide, but it is contended that with prooer
weighting the unreliability of the index can be greatly reduced.
Recognition of the fact that even a perfectly accurate index will
not be a complete measure is accorded, hut with this reminder, that
general changes in prosperity and broad general movements in business
activity can be sufficiently indicated.
it
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"'ith resDect to the gold situation and prices Gold Economists
also attempt to refute the arguments of their opponents with the
following points. "There never has been a case of sudden permanent
world-wide change in commodity orices in gold without a sudden in-
crease in the supply of gold in relation to the production of other
commodities."-'- Further, there is no instance in which velocity
of circulation has moved commodity prices far out of line with world
price in gold or has had any permanent influence on the world price
p
level in gold. Virtually all the increase in commodity prices
in the United States has resulted from the increase in the price
of gold. 3 Countries remaining on the gold standard have not had
the increase in commodity urices or improvement in business that
have developed in the United States. Since we left the gold standard
when orices in gold were not declining very much we had a rise in
prices of basic commodities about equal to the increase in the price
of gold. If it is oossible for a nation, by means of its credit
policy, to increr.se its efficiency in the use of gold enough to
raise commodity orices in gold, this increase would have to be of
world extent. The United States had no such increase in the five
years preceding the establishment of theFederal Reserve System.
1. G. F. Wsrren. "The Gold Situation", "Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science", Vol. 16, (April, 1934J o. 90.
2. Ibid.
3. F. A. Pearson. "Gold and Prices", "proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science", Vol. 16, (April, 1934) p.
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Credit Economists, who believe that price structure is simply a
matter of credit did not foresee the deoression; they did not under
stand the meaning of the gold stand? rd. The attempt to maintain
the price level and to restore the gold standard both affected the
value of gold and caused increased tariffs and quotas, dumping
restricted production and other clans to maintain prices when
colla .se was imminent. Since we began our gold purchase programme
the orice decline in gold seems to be checked. "The internal orice
level ofacountry is the result of the v/orld value of gold, which
is beyond the power of one nation to control, and the orice of gold
which is within the power of a nation to control. A nation can
establish any internal orice level that is desired, independent of
the rest of the world."-'- It is extremely desirable to have both
a stable internal orice level ?nd exchange rates, but if one must
be disregarded, it is preferable that it be exchange rates. The
critical oroblem of the thirty-five countries which have changed
prices of gold is to establish equilibrium in their flexible and
inflexible price structure v/ith respect to prices of gold. This
accr.molished, business conditions will improve in various countries
foreign trade will revive and private lending for foreign accounts
1. F. A. Pearson. "Gold and rrices", "Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science". Vol. 16, (April, 1934)
p. 41.
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will beein to develOD. " A. revival of international trade av/aits
a restoration of internal trade of various countries which in
turn awaits restoration of tv eir internal price equilibrium. We
can maintain the equilibrium by varying the orice of gold inversely
with the value of gold."-'- If we had abandoned the gold standard
simultaneously with England, we could have followed a more
leisurely procedure of revaluation.
Yet another attack on Dr. Warren's stable price doctrine is
made by. those who maintain that it is questionable whether a stshle
orice level is desirable in the United States as long as business is
conducted on a capitalistic basis. First, in such a society it is
imoossible to regulate each of the millions of items making up
the orice system so that they will all vary directly and Droportionally
with one another. If it were oracticfble, it would still be inex-
pedient to estsblish such a devise. In a dapitalistic society in
which variations of individual orices in relation to one another are
significant of the changing utility of different kinds of goods
and services, they are useful in determining how to distribute
labor with efficiency in socially imp rtant fields, to accelerate
1. F. A. Pearson. "Gold and Prices", "Proceedings of the
Academy of political Science." Vol. 16. (April, 1934)
^ p. 41.
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or retard the accuraula t ion of capital and direct it into profitable
channels of investment. In case of war, the question arises: Will
it be wiser to maintain a level price structure or to stimulate the
production of goods for military purposes by raising the price
structure? In periods of rapid technical improvement in the methods
of production ?nd in eras in which hither to unsuspected resources
are discovered greatly reducing the labor of producing goods for human
consumotion the expediency of a constant, unvarying price structure
may be questioned. Since 1926, many tyoes of business have greatly
reduced costs of operation through technological improvements; to
this group, the attainment of the 1926 price level would bring huge
orofits; to others, small profits. These opponents of the stable
price level stress the necessity that the orices of certain products
should rise, v/hile others should remain stationary or even fall be-
low their present levels.
I
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Part VII
Probable Future Influence of Dr. barren's
Monetary Doctrines

In view of the fact that Dr. Warren's monetsry doctrines have
been accepted by the government to the extent of the adoption of
a reflation programme including the Gold Purchase Plan, devaluation,
the commodity dollar, the commodity index number, and the partial
use of silver, the student is naturally led to sueculate on what
will be the orobsble future influence of those doctrines on our
fiscal and monetsry policies and history.
c
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In summary, then, of the probable future Influence of the
government monetary policies as directed by Dr. Warren, it
may be said:
We have yet to demonstrate whether economic recovery can be
effectively promoted by raising commodity prices through mone-
tary action. Study MTable IV Indexes of Wholesale Prices, 1935"
from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The following sta-
tistics published in the "Anne list" for July 6 are of interest
on this point. Prices received by farmers in mid-June had re-
covered over half their orevious loss and stood at seventy-
seven per cent of the pre-war level against a low of forty-nine
in February, 1933. Prices for what they buy now stand at one
hundred twenty-two oer cent of ore-war level against one hundred
one in February, 1933. But, notwithstanding the fifty-seven
per cent rise in prices received for farm oroducts, their ex-
change value has regained barely twenty-seven oer cent, or about
one fourth of the previous decline and has now only reached sixty-
three per cent of the ore-war.
This may be partly explained by the fact that while the A. A. A.
has undertaken to raise prices for farm Droducts, the N.R.A.
adonted the policy of higher prices for manufactured goods which
the farmers help consume. Part of the rise in prices paid by
farmers reflects the advance in farm prices themselves, the great-
er part, says Mr. Case,^- simply marks the success of the N.R.A.
1. W.W. Case, "A. A. A. Price Parity Goal Retreats Steadily
Before Rising Costs under N.R.A.", "The Annalist", (July 6, 1934)^
P. 8.

Table III
Indexes of Wholesale Prices , 1933
(Base: 1926 = 100)
March July Decern
Building Materials 70.8 79.5 85.6
Lumber
Cement
Iron and Steel
57.8
81.8
76.4
75.9
88.2
77.7
88.0
91.2
83.6
Petroleum products 33.1 41.3 51.6
Textile Products 51.3 68.0 76.4
Cotton Goods
Silk and Rayon
Woolen and Worsted
50.0
25.5
53.2
80.2
37.9
72.3
85.5
29.6
84.3
Hides and Skins 41.4 88.7 74.9
Leather 55.6 78.0 80.1
1. "Wholesale Price Series", U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Quoted from "Political Science Quarterly", Vol. 49, June,
1934, p. 168.
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in neutralizing to a considerable degree the progress of this
other department of government. Prices paid by the farmer after
the quiet period lost autumn have risen steadily and show every
appearance of a continued upward movement. In point of fact,
the exchange value of farm products has maintained only a most
uncertain advance in the pest six months; at the present rate it
will require years to reach the A. A. A. objective for the farmer.
The moderate rise of exchange value does not indicate an actual
improvement in the farmer's situation because exchange value com-
pletely disregards the size of crops and volume of products sold.
It is possible that the program of production curtailment pro-
gram of the A. A. A. has so reduced the farmer's commercial output
as far more than to offset any rise in prices received.
The index of total farm purchasing power was 73.0 of the
1924- '29 level in May compared with a low of 55.3 in February
1933.1 There wes a gain in fifteen months of thirty-two per cent
or one third, a gain comparable with the rise of twenty-nine per
cent in the unit exchange values of farm products. If costs
had not risen^farrn purchasing power would now be about eighty-
seven per cent of the 1924-'29 level, instead of seventy-three. 3
1. W. W. Case, "A. A. a. Price Parity Goal Retreats Steadily
Before Rising Costs under N.R.A.", "The Annalist", (July 6, 1934)
P. 9.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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Adapted Table of B^sic Commodity Conditions
Cotton
(lb)
of pre-war
445b (Feb. 1953)
Wheat 36^ (Feb. 1932)
Hays (still below
levels of 1931
until drought
sent n.rices up)
June 1934
77^
(88% with benefit
payments
)
75%
(87% with benefit
payments
72%
(40# with benefits
to 1931 level)
Low
34 /'(June 1932)
33 (j id-summer
1931)
Butter and milk, we are told were never so badly inflated
pnd show only slight gains. Rice and tobacco show some gains
partly exnlainable through marketing agreements. Mr. Case ex-
plains the recovery in cotton and wheat as due largely to the
devaluation of the dollar which raised their value in terms of
domestic currency v/ithout increasing to a orooortional extent
the orices of the goods for whieh the farmer exchanges them.
Cotton was also favored by the revival of world consumotion.
There have been two very short wheat crops. The fall in the
dollar was also a factor in the condition of rice and tobacco.
Those improvements in ourchasing power of basic comnodities
are c nf ined almost entirely to those that are concerned in world
markets
.
"That their orices in terms of gold dollars would fail to
support such gains is beside the point so far as the farmer is
1. V« W« Case, "A. A. A. Price Parity Goal Retreats Steadily
Before Rising Costs under N.R.A.% "The Annalist", (July 6, 1934)
p. 9
v
concerned; it is in current paper dollars that his purchases
are made and his debts paid
"The less immediate effects of devaluation, the precedent
for currency manipulation by a government in favor of parti-
cular classes, and under political pressure, with its threat
to savings and to all financial provisions for the future, its
encouragement of unhealthy speculative activity and its intro-
duction of uncertainty into the very foundations of our economic
structure, these are another matter for whieft payment may be
exacted far into the future.""''
"The inability of the administration to give an answer to the
question (of agriculture) is in pr.rt due to lack of official
grasp of the economic situation as a whole, and of the prin-
ciples controlling it as is shown in its frivolous monetary
pclicy and in its mutually exclusive price raising acts of the
N.R.A. and the A. A. A."2
The United States Treasury is now in a position to raise
huge sums simply by selling short-term certificates to banks
as a result of the executive order providing for a bounty to
the silver producers, the seizure of profits of gold (Gold
Reserve Act, January 30,1934) v/hich gave the Treasury power
1. '"inthrop Case, "Price Parity Goal Retreats Steadily
Before Rising Costs under N.R.A.", "The Annalist", July 6, 1934.
d. 9.
2. Ibid.

to expend vest sums of money without need of taxation or re-
gulation°^)orrowing. Bank "portfolios" consist now auite
largely of government obligations, a condition which makes
it difficult for the banker to discriminate the type of business
operations that are worthy of credit because their borrowings
will automatically be liquidated through sale of goods. Many
economists consider the position of banks an anachronism for
commercial credit institutions.
Economic disturbances resulting from implications of mone-
tary uncertainty express themselves principally, then, in con-
nection with international trade, the capital market, and
government credit uncertainty with resoect to the value of
currencies increases the risk in short-term credit operations
upc n which the conduct of foreign trade is dependent and
leads usually to i complete cessation of long-term investment.
The result is decreased trade.
Retaliatory measures by foreign countries are the inevitable
result of an artificial stimulus to exports implied in a de-
preciated currency: higher tariffs, import licenses, quota
systems, or competition in currency depreciation. These re-
sults have followed the same causes in nation after nation
since the war. Demoralization of international trade in
general and '"the production of v/ealth everywhere has resulted.
Unemployment and impoverishment have flourished.
(
In the capital market we recognize the resumption of
capital enterprise deoends primarily uoon the return to normal
issues of long-term securities. Uncertainty of the monetary
policy has long retarded the fluctuation of these securities.
Experience with inflation in other countries reveals that
price advances, especially if they take place in a short-time,
are neither orderly nor well-balanced. In such a case there
may be danger of wild spending and we cannot be sure the bank-
ing system will be in possession of the customary controls over
inflationary tendencies.
Economists believe that if increases in Federal Reserve
discount rates should be decreed, the Treasury would object;
hardening of money markets could restrict the Treasury from
borrowing money at low rates. Such opposition prevented the
Federal Reserve Banks from raising discount rates promptly
after the war in 1919. It is possible for the exnerience to
be repeated.
The volume of member-bank reserve balances may be lowered
by selling government securities in the open market. The
Treasury will probably oopose sales of government securities
until the budget is definitely balanced.
Raising reserve requirements would be very effective
device for restricting member-bank credit extensions; it would
operate directly r-nd oromptly.
1
Centrel banking action cannot dp counted upon to supply an
effective restraint in case prices get out of hand; the controls
are too difficult of operation.
From the point of view of much current comment among the
economists the great need is a return to a modified gold
standard and the re-establishment of a credit system on a basis
which will allow time-honored practices to be resumed.
4
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Part VIII
^ Conclusions Regarding Dr. Warren's Monetary
Doctrines
f
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DR. WARREN 1 S MONETARY DOCTRINES.
Having studied some of the best and most tyoical of the
current comment on the monetary doctrines of Dr. VJarren, their
manner of Governmental operation, and probable influence on our
future monetary history, we may now assemble the results of our
survey regarding the orthodoxy, traditionalism or radicalism of
his doctrines on the gold standard, inflation, deflation, re-
flation, regarding the soundness, the validity and reliability
of his doctrines, regarding the statistical justification of
his commodity dollar ,and regarding whether or not his orogramme
aids recovery or reform to the greater degree.
Most economists olace Dr. Warren in the category of the Old
Economist in view of his reliance on the Quantitative Theory
of Money, but in the category of the New Economist on the basis
of his advocacy of the commodity index number and the commodity
dollar. His position on the gold standard might give him a
double classification since some Old Economists support our
abandonment of the metal while some New Economists believe we
sh< uld return to a modified gold standard. If sixty-four
members of the faculty of a veil-known college of finance
and commerce and other professional groups have felt it im-
cumbent uDon them to issue manifestos , before the end of
December, 1953, denouncing inflation and demanding an immediate
t
return to t he gold standard, we are warranted in concluding
that there is considerable lack of confidence in the gold
standard and reflation policies of our monetary dictator
throughout the country on the Dart of leaders conversant with
monetary affairs. Fear that uncontrolled inflation will fin-
ally result unless prices rise more quickly than they are likely
to, is exoressed by most of the economists whose opinions we
have just investigated. That he is not conservative will be
easily conceded, but that he is truly radical in this experi-
mentation not all economists or New Dealers admit. We may con-
clude that going off the gold standard when the country had a
sufficient supply of gold and excellent credit was untraditional
and questionably sound.
To the New Dealers who support the contentions of Professors
Wesley C. Mitchell, Fred C. Mills, CP. whelden, and Thorp, the
commodity index number and commodity dollar seem to have statis-
tical bases. To other economists, the desirability of a stable
commodity price seems greatly exaggerated, and they conclude
that since modern banking systems have become effective, the
quantity of gold has had little if any influence on either the
immediate or the long-time general price level and that if ex-
traordinary increases in gold supply have affected commodity
1. P. E. Barnes, "Money Changers v«. The New Deal", p. 153
and note 1.
t
prices at all, which they doubt, it has taken five years or
longer to manifest itself. They further conclude that there
is no reason to believe the price level can be raised by
manipulation of the gold supply and that attempts to raise
the price level by manipulating the credit supply will either
fail or lead to worse disaster. They find no instance in history
of a healthy rise in prices resulting from an artificial easing
of credit and no statistical basis for the commodity dollar.
Yet another eminent statistician holds that Dr. v/arren, to-
gether with other economist statisticians, has become tangled
in his own figures in such matters as determining average whole-
sale price and index numbers, and asserts that only when average
price is known at the time does a resultant index tell how much
of the commodities a dollar of wages will buy. The index of pur-
chasing power of wages has little meaning except as an accompany-
ing index of average prices. Consequently none of the resultant
indexes secured by operating on the so-called Wholesale Price
Index means what it claims. He further insists that any
market procedure established under these conditions will bring
different results than expected and they maybe destructive
in their reactions.
t«
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Here seems to be evidence that there are some grounds for
questioning the statistical bases, and the scientific re-
liability and validity of the commodity index number and the
commodity dollar.
Opinion as to whether or not Dr. Warren's programme will aid
recovery or merely institute an innovation or reform seems to
divide the economists. That bimetallism will not help many
agree with him; they are not enthusiatic supports of symetal"lism
however. Several look UDon the programme as an expedient for
short-time operation and not a long-time programme. The
sagacity of either group will be determined by "hether or not
prices rise in a moderately short time and whether credit
speculation sets in after a time, or e runaway price and a
higher degree of inflation. We concede that his honest in-
tentions are to raise orices, stimulate re-employment and
recovery as well as to reform our monetary policies. Quite
insistent, however, seems to b e the contention of many economist
bankers, and business men that those objectives cannot be
attained by adopting the commodity dollar and operating a
domestic currency independent of international agreement, and
without regard to consequences in exchange relations.
<
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